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A Study of TSX Venture Exchange Listed Stocks 2002-2006
Objectives of
the Study : The objectives of this thesis are: i) to determine if there is any new 
information conveyed to the market in the trades of insiders of junior natural 
resource companies which is incorporated into the security’s price; ii) to 
determine if the market assigns the trades of different types of insiders 
different levels of informational value through different price reactions;
iii) to determine if the price reaction differs for insider sales and purchases;
iv) to determine the correlation between transaction size and price reaction;
v) to determine if information regarding the trade is available to the market 
prior to its official disclosure.
Data: The dataset used in this paper is based on insider trading records for 31,047 
transactions in 313 junior natural resource companies between January Ist, 
2002 and December 31st, 2006 which were traded on the Venture Exchange 
of the Toronto Stock Exchange. The insider trading records was obtained 
from the System for Electronic Disclosure by Insiders (SEDI), and share 
price data from DataStream.
Methodology: This paper uses an event study for a 21 day window from -5 to +15 days 
bracketing a transaction and analyzes the abnormal prices and volumes 
occurring as a result of the transaction.
Results: The market does assign infonnational value to insider trades at different 
levels for different categories of insiders at a statistically significant level, 
with an average cumulative abnormal return of 1.73% for purchases and 
-3.33% for sales. These trades also cause statistically significant cumulative 
abnormal volume of 1.84% and 1.82% for purchases and sales respectively. 
Though no correlation was found between the size of the trade and the 
degree of market reaction, information leakage does occur, as abnormal 
returns and volumes begin to occur prior to the official release of the trade 
infonnation.
Key Terms: Insider trading, junior natural resource, event study, cumulative abnormal 
return, cumulative abnormal volume.
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Insiders have a unique insight into the future prospects of a company’s business. From time 
to time some take advantage of this through well timed share purchases and sales. By 
definition, insiders are senior officers, directors, and major shareholders of listed companies1. 
The stock trades executed by insiders may very well signal a material change in a company’s 
future prospects.
Many studies have examined the profitability of insider trading, the fairness to the average 
investor, or the degree to which undisclosed information is abused. These studies have 
largely focused on the US, or major European markets, leaving the Canadian securities 
market relatively less scrutinised. Canada presents an interesting market to study the effects 
of insider trading, as regulators have been known to be much less intensive in their 
enforcement of securities laws2. However, the Ontario Court of Appeals overturn of Andrew 
Rankin’s insider trading convictions3 on November 9th, 2006, has lead some to expect future 
enforcement to be stricter. New laws and a registry system controlling the availability and 
timing of insider disclosure have recently been implemented. Regulation of the securities 
markets is a provincial responsibility and despite many efforts over the years to create a 
national regulatory body, all such attempts have floundered on the unwillingness of the 10 
provinces or the federal government (which also governs over the three territories) to cede 
control.
1 See Appendix 1 : Definition of an Insider According to the Securities Act of Ontario
2 Jackson 2006; McNally and Smith 2003, Globe and Mail November 15th, 2006
3 Calgary Sun November 11 2006
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1.2 Canadian Marketplace
A sector of the Canadian capital markets that is particularly remunerative for insider trading is 
the natural resource market. Specifically, the junior natural resources market as these early 
stage mining exploration companies offer the greatest volatility and highest potential returns 
of the natural resources firms, as can be seen in Figure 1 in the “discovery” section where 
upon successful discovery a stock can increase many times in value. It is in this stage of a 
company’s existence when the potential for information asymmetry between informed 
insiders and outsiders is the greatest, and when the trading patterns of insiders may reveal new 
information to the markets.
___________________Figure 1: The Life Cycle of a Mining Share___________________
The Lifecycle of an exploration and development company is highly rewarding in the early stages as shown 
in the lifecycle chart below. To be a successful investor in these sectors, a high degree of technical expertise 
is invaluable in determining whether or not a discovery is commercially valuable.
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The securities markets in Canada are tailored to the sector, which is why, in part it is the 
premier exchange for the exploration and development for resource stocks in the world, The 
Toronto Stock Exchange and the TSX Venture Exchange have been so successful in financing 
these junior companies, that they have become a proxy for US investors and for many other 
investors around the world. For example the United States has unduly burdensome 
regulations and many that are inappropriate for the mining and oil and gas industry,
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particularly for early stage exploration companies. Only the AIM4 5in the UK has tried to 
provide a competitive trading platform, with growing results, as the technical expertise, depth 
of market and infrastructure in Toronto exceeds that of any other market in the world for this 
sector. It could also be argued that the Australian Stock Exchange would be an appropriate 
market for this study, but due to its different trading regulations and listing requirements, it 
does not fulfil the criteria of this study as well as the Venture Exchange, and as Table 1 
shows, Toronto has by far the greatest number of listed mining companies from which to 
choose for this study.
_____________ Table 1: Listed Companies and Financing by Exchange_____________
In terms of global market share, as of December 31st, 2006 the TSX and TSX-V collectively list the vast
majority of all mining firms in the world, and over 40% of all mining financing occurred on the Toronto 
markets for 2005. All figures are in millions of US dollars, with N/А indicating that the data was not 
available for the Amex and JSE exchanges. Note that the number of listed companies quoted here represents 
all mining companies, i.e. from multibillion dollar senior producers through to microcap juniors. The 
exchange abbreviations below are: ASX: Australian Stock Exchange, LSE-AIM: London Stock Exchange 
Alternative Market, Amex: American Stock Exchange, JSE: Johannesburg Stock Exchange, NYSE: New 
York Stock Exchange.
Source: TSX “A Global Resource for Capital”
TSX & ASX LSE-AIM Amex JSE NYSE
TSX Venture
1274 543 222 60 52 45
US$ 4,000 US$ 654 US$1,700 N/A N/A US$41
Given the institutionalisation of the Canadian capital markets over the last few decades, 
interest in corporate governance and ensuring integrity of the marketplace is central to such 
sophisticated investors to ensure their investments are not jeopardized by a lax regulatory 
environment and poor corporate governance practices by managements and Boards of 
Directors. Since inception, there have been very few prosecutions under the various securities 
laws in Canada, especially compared to the level of enforcement in, for example, the United 
States by the Securities and Exchange Commission^. Pension funds are becoming more 
vociferous in their concerns and don't hesitate to voice them publicly and through shareholder 
votes. As of April 2007, the Ontario Teacher’s Pension Fund is in the process of launching a 
$32 billion privatization bid for Bell Canada Enterprises, (a blue chip company) to increase
4 The AIM is the London Stock Exchange’s listing for companies that are small start ups offering a market with 
a pragmatic and appropriate approach to regulation to ease access to capital.
5 “In certain areas, the evidence is quite clear that Canadian enforcement activity is less intensive than U.S. 
enforcement activity....private enforcement (both arbitration and class action litigation) is much less common in 
Canada than in the United States. Criminal prosecutions also appear to be much less common ” -Jackson 2006
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shareholder returns as they have been quite dissatisfied with its performance over the past 5 to 
10 years6. This proactive approach will also continue with regard to corporate governance.
The junior natural resource industry in Canada is known for being a tightly knit community 
which facilitates the dissemination of information quickly; be it rumours, or facts. Bearing all 
of the above in mind, it calls into question, how long after an insider completes a trade is that 
information be kept secret so that the markets could not react to it and incorporate it into the 
security’s price. Also, is that information something that the markets would give any signal 
value to in the first place? Insiders of such companies are highly courted by investors to gain 
a unique insight into what recent or future activities might mean from a commercial point-of- 
view.
1.3 Current Commodities Market
The period from 2002-2006 witnessed the rise of a broad spectrum of commodity prices 
which also coincides with the time frame since the new insider laws have been introduced. 
From the early 2000’s when gold and other traditional hard asset investments bottomed in the 
face of a very strong economy and low interest rates, commodity prices hit extreme lows, as 
shown in the prices of gold and silver in Figure 2. At the tail end of the period is the more 
recent almost parabolic appreciation of commodity prices after a weakening US economy and 
lax economic policy caused investors to shift their focus back onto hard assets pushing them 
to highs not seen in decades, especially evident in the current mania surrounding uranium 
(2001 $8.00/lb. low to 2007 $113/lb.high) and molybdenum stocks.
6 Financial Times, April 10, 2007
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_________________ Figure 2: Price Trends of Major Commodities_________________
These graphs illustrate the increasing price trends for gold and silver (which is representative of the price 
trends for most other minerals) over the period of 2002 to 2006 by basing them to 100 on January 1st, 2002. 
During this period the prices of these metals have at least doubled, and at some points in time been over three 
times their original value, which has caused many more mineral properties to become economically feasible, 
and has caused renewed interest in the sector as a whole. There has been a significant increase in the activity
in searching for prospective properties as well, as firms aim to cash in on this booming market sector.
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In Canada, the rapid increase in raw materials prices has led to a wave of new junior natural 
resource companies which have been created to exploit well known deposits and to explore 
potential new mineral deposits. Rising prices have made many previously uneconomic 
deposits viable at these high prices. This has created a market rich with listed companies on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange, (TSX, formerly TSE) focused on the exploration and 
development of mineral deposits, which has translated into the listing of 477 new mining 
companies on the TSX Venture exchange in 2006 alone.
1.4 Focus
The focus of this study is insider trading in the shares of junior natural resource companies 
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Specifically, what effect do transactions of an insider
7 TSX “A Global Resource for Capital”
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have in terms of share impact, over what duration, and with what associated volume? In 
addition, how long does it take following an insider transaction for that information to 
become incorporated into a junior natural resource company’s share price?
The remainder of this study is divided into six chapters. In Chapter Two an overview the 
theory behind this thesis is presented. Chapter Three describes different approaches and 
theories used by other researchers in solving this issue. Chapter Four presents the 
methodology that is applied to the data collected in order to obtain the results. Chapter Five, 
reports the findings obtained, and provides an explanation of the meaning of the results. 




Junior natural resource (JNR) companies, particularly those in mineral exploration and 
development should provide an excellent set of companies from which to measure the effect 
of insider trades. Typically, a JNR has only one core asset, which is their mineral exploration 
property portfolio8 9. JNR’s create wealth by exploring and developing their portfolio of 
mineral properties. This is accomplished by prioritizing properties on the basis of completing 
geological surveys, researching the history of the area’s previous mineral deposit discoveries 
and ultimately by drilling the property. Hence, value creation for the company comes from the 
discovery of a mineralized structure on their property, which is proved to be an economically 
viable and exploitable deposit. Though much about a property's geological potential can be 
determined prior to any drilling, the value a market assigns to such a property is driven 
mainly by drill results which provide concrete demonstrable evidence of the nature and extent 
of the mineralization. As a JNR completes successive drill holes, they are required to publish 
press releases which contain their findings. The JNR’s share price quickly incorporates an 
economic or speculative view of these results. Early stage exploration investments are highly 
risky. The properties are often in remote areas, which are difficult and expensive to explore. 
If they are near towns or cities, residents may well object to their commercialization. 
Furthermore, failure to find economically viable mineral deposits is common and can be due 
to a host of issues ranging from complex metallurgical issues, to ore body faulting, poor 
ground conditions or lawsuits.
Most JNRs do not find economically viable mineral deposits and typically go on to find new 
projects. Their share prices fall drastically (should a speculative rise have been registered in 
their share price during a recent exploration program), or at best, remain dormant. However, 
for those that do go on to successfully find an ore body, estimated at perhaps 1 in every 3,000 
properties assessed ', their stock prices can easily increase to multiple times their pre­
discovery values within very short timeframes measured in weeks or months at the outside.
8 It is rare for a JNR to have only one property as it is usually considered to be too risky. They typically have at 
least one other “home run” in the works.
9 A general rule of thumb followed by industry professionals
8
The risk/reward feature embodied in these securities is a “lottery ticket” like economic 
outcome for investors along with the potential for extreme volatility. Investors either win big 
or loose most of their invested capital (not withstanding possible tax offsets). Figure 3 gives 
an example of one well known firm which found a large deposit of gold and experienced an 
extremely sharp appreciation in its share price in a short period of time.
Figure 3: A Lottery Ticket Type Firm in Practice
As an example of the “lottery ticket” nature of JNRs, we can take Aurelian Resources Inc. (ARU). At the 
beginning of 2005, the share price of ARU was $0.74, though by December 29, 2006, ARU’s share price had 
increased enormously to $31.00, after having reached prices over $40 per share a few months before. All of 
this increase came as a result of successive releases of some extremely promising drill results obtained from 
their main property in Ecuador. Though the company needs to gather more information from drilling to be able 
to confirm the size of the deposit, it has been speculated that it could be one of the largest in the world.
Aurelian Resources Inc.
25.00
It is exactly this “lottery ticket” nature of JNRs that makes them an attractive subset of 
securities to study. Since insiders are typically considered to be better informed than the 
average investor, any transactions they complete would most likely be viewed as strong 
indications of the potential of the company’s mineral property, and therefore its future stock 
price. This paper seeks to identify exactly to what degree the market will react to any 
insider’s transactions by completing cumulative abnonnal return studies pre and post each 
trade.
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“Street gossip10’’ in the industry could also occur with relative ease due to the channels of 
communication and the aforementioned tightly knit community that forms the industry. Most 
managers of these companies are active in multiple JNRs at one and the same time. The same 
is true for directors, who often share their time between several ventures. This is done 
because at any given time one of the companies may be “dormant” or waiting for results, 
licences, studies, etc to be completed while another company may be active. This allows a 
manager to efficiently use their time by having very little in the way of idle periods that 
would otherwise occur when working with just one company. It is also done to hedge the 
risks to a manager that any single company fails to find an economic ore body. If at least one 
of their several companies is successful it can be more than offset in the disappointments from 
the other companies in the meantime. This would not be possible if they were operating only 
one company. However, this also means that there are comparatively few people active in the 
industry which creates an environment where most managers are familiar with one another, 
and aware of the development and current state of other JNRs. Consequently, this creates 
personal relationships and channels of communication through which “street gossip” can be 
disseminated quickly and effectively.
2.2 Ontario Law Governing Securities
The Securities Act (Ontario) (“OSA”) provides the legal framework that governs securities 
listed, traded, and distributed in Ontario, as this is a matter that falls under provincial 
jurisdiction. Prior to December 14th, 1999 an insider of a company registered in Ontario was 
required to file any insider securities trades within 30 days of the end of the month during 
which the transaction took place allowing up to 40 days to pass after the transaction prior to 
the trade becoming publicly available information. However, on December 14th, 1999 11 
those laws changed, and since then according to the OSA, an insider12 of a company must file 
a record of their transaction within 10 days of having made said transaction13.
10 In terms of this thesis, street gossip is defined as any the spread of non-public rumors or facts concerning the 
company or any related developments, such as trading activity of insiders.
Under amendment Re-en.l999,c.9,s.214 commenced by Royal Assent on December 14th, 1999
12 Refer to appendix 7.1 Definition of an Insider According to the Securities Act of Ontario.
13 According to amendment Re-en. 1999,c.9,s.214 under the OSA, which governs trade on the TSX, an insider of 
a company is required to report trades to the Ontario Securities Commission within 10 days of the trade (OSA, 
Section 107(2)).
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Another change which occurred in May 200314 15was the creation of the System for Electronic 
Disclosure by Insiders (“SEDI”) which is the database in which all insider activity is listed 
and is accessible on the internet by the general public. All data is immediately registered 
there, and has eased the accessibility of such data to the average investor immensely and at no 
cost to the investor to access such data.
These laws leave a period of time between the moment of the trade and the actual public 
disclosure of that information which presents an interesting point to study. Theoretically, in 
accordance with the Efficient Market Hypothesis'3, there should be no anomalous price 
changes resulting from the insider transaction during this period. It should be in the days 
following the public disclosure on SEDI that any abnormal price changes occur, and this 
thesis aims to determine if this holds true in practice.
In the realm of JNRs a long standing unofficial strategy used by investors is to buy on 
rumours and sell on news. This gives some insight into the psychology of that market’s 
participants, as it suggests there are leaks of information in the form of “street gossip’’ that 
allow those closest to the company (without officially being listed as insiders) to change the 
level of their holdings in response to their view of a company’s prospects. This should 
become even more evident with an insider’s trades, as they may also be able to distinguish 
between what is economically relevant to the company’s future prospects as compared to any 
insider’s personal objectives, such as tax planning, need for cash to take advantage of other 
investment opportunities, estate planning and diversification, etc. If so, then what is the size 
of this effect?
2.3 Determining who is Important
An efficient JNR requires that much of the available financial resources be devoted to the 
exploration of their properties. In some cases up to 80% of funds raised are used for 
exploration and development activities. This is possible as they are most often run by a 
minimum of staff to minimize their cash bum rate, and use specialized services, including 
drilling by contracting out to third parties. In some cases this means that there are no more 
than a total of 10 employees including any ancillary staff. As a result of this need to keep
14 According to SEDI website
15 For more information on the efficient market hypothesis see Fama (1970)
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staff levels to a minimum and ensure the utmost flexibility and efficiency, the roles of 
employees may be wide-ranging, with their exact titles not representative of their complete 
array of duties. In such a company, one could begin to question the significance of the 
seniority of different levels of staff. Might it mean that the impact of any insider trades 
completed is the same for a senior officer, as someone of a lower official rank?
As is human nature, self-interest should be the sharpest spur for change, and therefore I 
hypothesize that investors would still most likely regard the trades of higher level staff (who 
are typically the largest shareholders and the best informed as to the company’s potential) as a 
greater signal than those of other levels regardless of the actual number of employees active in 
a company. In order to shed light on this issue, I intend to differentiate between the classes of 
insiders to determine what, if any differences occur. This hypothesis is supported by Seyhun 
(1985) who concluded that higher level insiders trade on more valuable information, and 
therefore, are able to earn greater abnormal returns.
2.4 The Outside Insider
As stated before, according to Canadian law, an insider can be a shareholder who holds more 
than 10% of the company’s stock. That raises the question, as to what may happen with an 
individual who holds 9.9% and for all intents and purposes is as good as an insider but is not 
legally required to report any shareholdings. This relates to the structure of the company’s 
ownership base. Specifically, are there enough other market participants interested in a 
particular JNR’s stock for those large shareholders to be able to dispose of their shares 
without causing an over supply, and therefore, a significant price drop? Although 
theoretically, such a 9.9% owner could easily manipulate the market and earn large abnormal 
profits, I intend to investigate whether it is actually practicable for a 9.9% holder to make a 
quick exit in these sometimes highly illiquid stocks. This is important when considering 
trading in JNRs as oftentimes their financings come from large institutional investors who 
purchase shares through underwritings. Many of those investors end up holding a large 
portion of the company’s equity as either they cannot sell or they continue to accumulate 
stock in the open market to support the share price. In order to determine the ease with which 
such a shareholder is able to liquidate their position, I intend to complete a test of liquidity for 
the stocks selected which will be explained in detail in the methodology section.
12
2.5 Sources of Information & the Real Insider
One might wonder exactly when the leakage of information occurs that may spur an insider 
trade. At a typical exploration property that is currently being drilled, the contracted drilling 
crew’s members usually have nearby access to satellite phones, radio communications, cell 
phones, land line telephones and/or computers, and are known to trade the security of the 
exploration company based on the drill core samples that they view as it is being taken out for 
assaying before even the company sees it. This information could then trickle down through 
informal information channels to members of their family, friends, etc. who might then also 
complete a trade based on that same information. There are also the assay laboratories 
involved which complete the actual processing of the core to determine its mineral content. 
These people have a definitive view of the richness of the core sample and have also been 
known to trade based on this information. Although, such a blatant misuse of information 
would result in not only a financial penalty and possible jail time, anyone caught under these 
circumstances, would become permanently unemployable in the industry. The seriousness of 
such penalties means that any trading that occurs from the above mentioned types of 
information channels would be very difficult to measure directly due to those investors paying 
particular attention to making trades as anonymously as possible.
2.6 Ownership Base and Signal Interpretation
It is postulated that a determinant of some of the price reaction severity is related to the 
structure of the ownership base. That is, a stock with a large number of small retail investors 
who are speculators may be more likely to experience more exaggerated returns than one 
which consists of sophisticated institutional investors who hold larger blocks of shares. Their 
different reactions could be due to speculators being frightened more easily and thus loosing 
confidence in the company’s value, or it may even be that they are investing with a short term 
horizon and want to capitalize on the effect of the insider trade. They also don’t usually have 
to contend with liquidity concerns as their purchases and sales are in significantly lesser 
amounts than institutions, i.e. thousands of dollars versus millions of dollars. Whereas a stock 
with a more informed shareholder base may be less likely to react as greatly because of a 
different interpretation of the insider sale, and view it as a less significant signal to future 
prices.
Given the clout in the marketplace that an institution carries, they may have a better insight 
into the motivation behind a transaction, either through close communications with the
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company or through their financial intermediaries. This also raises the question of an 
insider’s anonymity in the sale of shares. Trading on the Toronto Stock exchange can be 
done anonymously at the time of the transaction in order to hide their identity. Others will 
use multiple brokers to distribute their trades and further obscure where the trading activity 
lies. As a result, an insider can sell shares under the anonymous name, and no one would 
knows who they had completed the trade until after its public disclosure. This makes it 
difficult if not impossible for market participants to know with any degree of certainty with 
whom they are trading until after the end of the trading session. This means that during 
trading hours an insider could effectively manipulate the market as they please, though in 
practice this is highly unlikely.
2. 7 TSX Venture Exchange
The TSX Venture Exchange was established in mid 2001 as a result of the buyout by the TSX 
of the CDNX (Vancouver stock exchange) which was known for a high concentration of 
JNRs. It is a unique marketplace, as its listing requirements allow emerging companies which 
would not qualify for listing elsewhere eased access to capital and a higher public profile. 
Because of its unique nature, and Canada’s favourable securities laws for the resources 
industry, it has become a world center for JNRs. A unique feature has come to be offered by 
the TSX and TSX Venture exchanges as a further result of securities act changes in 2001. 
This feature is the ability to cloak the identity of a transacting party by trading under the name 
“anonymous”. Normally, all market bids and asks have their associated Participating 
Organization’s names and identity numbers attached. However, any Participating 
Organization may chose at any time to make a trade under the anonymous name with an 
identity number 001. This actual identity of an anonymous trade participant remains 
protected until after settlement, and is available publicly at the end of the trading day from the 
Central Depository for Securities at 5:05 pm.
The TSX Venture Exchange has also begun to attract increasing attention and capital from 
investors with the abnormally high returns that it has been able to deliver as a result of a 
combination its high weighting of natural resource related firms, rising commodities prices, 
and the highly volatile “lottery ticket” nature of JNRs as was described in subsection 2.1, 
particularly during the period from 2002 to 2006 for which the true magnitude of these gains 
can be seen when comparing them to other major international exchanges as in Figure 4.
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_____________Figure 4: Market Performance Comparison 2002 to 2006_____________
The true significance of the particularly high growth rate of the TSX Venture Exchange becomes even more 
apparent when compared to other indices over the years to be studied in this paper. This chart displays the 
total index return between the years 2002 to 2006 for major international indices. This growth has not gone 
unnoticed by investors, and has begun to attract capital from other markets and investors who would not 
traditionally choose to invest in this “unorthodox” industry, which has further compounded the growth rate. 




















2.8 Flow-through financing and royalties
Another unique aspect of the Canadian resources market is a tax predicated financing method 
called flow-through financing. Flow-through financing allows a company to make an 
investment that is used expressly for the exploration of natural resources. Companies are 
given a tax credit equal to 100% of the amount of their exploration expenditures on qualified 
Canadian properties. The tax credit can be used against their taxable Canadian income or sold 
to third parties by way of equity financings known as flow-through financings. The acquirers 
of the tax credits can be either corporations or individual investors. The tax credit can be 
carried back three years, or forward 10 years against taxes paid in those years in order to 
either recover taxes paid, or to reduce taxes payable in the current year. A second tax credit 
that is also available is called The Investment Tax Credit for Exploration (ITCE) which 
allows for special tax credits to be granted on investments made by exploration companies on 
mining projects located within Canada. The governments of Canada, the provinces and the
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territories specifically promote the development of mineral deposits to offset the high risk of 
failure and to promote economic activity in remote areas of the country.
For example, the Ontario provincial government tax credit amounts to 15% of the invested 
amount that can also be carried forward or backward identically to the regular flow through 
financing credit system. The Federal government also has a further credits structured like the 
ITCE. The amount offered is 5% for a Total of 120% in tax offsets to individual investors 
available for projects undertaken in Ontario. The amount granted varies from one province or 
territory to another. Any insider or outside investor may participate in such a flow-through 
share issuance in the same fashion as any other private placement. Due to their nature, these 
investments are already in essence, “in the money” at the time of issuance and may therefore 
cause their holders to have different holding strategies and cause different reactions in the 
public market.16. The effects of this may be visible in the distribution of trade frequency 
throughout the year, as owners of these shares may wish to sell in December for tax reasons 
and the purchase of these shares may be highest around March and April in order to create a 
tax shield. Most importantly, this form of financing is highly likely to play a role I the JNR 
capital market, as 4,511 of the 8,565 properties17 owned by mining firms listed on the TSX 
and TSX Venture Exchanges are located in Canada, and therefore eligible for the flow­
through program.
16 Natural Resources Canada, “The Restructuring of Resource Taxation” and Clark (2004)
17 As of January 2006. Source: TSX “A Global Resource for Capital”
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3 Literature Review
Most previous literature is based on the study of the profitability of insider trading, the 
fairness to the average investor, or the degree to which undisclosed information is abused. 
Much of that has been analysed from a legal or economics perspective. However, the studies 
have largely focused on the US, or major European markets, leaving the Canadian securities 
market relatively untouched. A few Canadian studies have been produced, some relatively 
recently. However, all of these studies aimed to determine the effects of insider trading in 
firms which are already well established, and many are from the perspective of the 
profitability of trading to the insider. None to my knowledge have ever considered natural 
resources related junior companies even as a subcategory.
Evidence of insider trading causing abnormal returns is by no means a new body of study. A 
multitude of research over the course of the past decades has either sought to prove or 
disprove its occurrence. A large number of these older studies found evidence of insider 
trading causing short term abnormal returns. These are an extremely relevant set of studies to 
consider when comparing to the study of JNRs as these researchers have evidence from 
market conditions that are most comparable to the modem day JNRs. Both current JNRs and 
past normal stock markets exhibited a lower level of publicly available information, with the 
daily activities of the companies being much more opaque to the average investor. In both 
situations, there is a high likelihood of information asymmetry in relation to the market in 
general. Therefore, the trades of insiders would likely be interpreted as representations of 
their views on that company’s future perfonnance potential.
3.1 Historic Studies
Rogoff (1964) for example, found that the return of insiders of the companies studied in the 6 
months following a trade were approximately 9.5% higher than the market. Glass (1966) 
results concur with this, as he found that they exhibited excess returns of 10% versus the 
market, when he examined a selection of 8 companies with the highest amount of insider buys 
to sells over 14 months.
Lorie & Neiderhofffer (1968) approach from a slightly different perspective, by looking at the 
intensity of buying activity in the companies tested, and find that securities that experience
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high levels of insider purchasing in a month, are likely to rise in rise in the following six 
months. The same characteristics were noted in net selling months by insiders and declines in 
the share price of the firms. One extremely interesting comment, which is particularly 
applicable in the context of this study, was that in their paper, Lorie & Neiderhoffer stated 
that “This study indicates that proper and prompt analysis of data on insider trading can be 
profitable”. In other words there is strong evidence that the information available to insiders 
did have substantial value. Hence, if the same type of results hold true of JNRs, then 
investors should profit highly from following the same trade patterns as insiders. A further 
important observation from Lorie & Neiderho ffer’s study is their conclusion, that by the time 
the information was publicly available that an insider has transacted, there were no further 
profits to be made from acting on the published data. This strongly suggests that “street 
gossip” was a factor then, and leaves open the possibility that it could very well still be 
present in today’s JNR marketplace.
A significant study in the realm of event-study analysis, particularly with regards to insider 
trading, is that of Jaffe (1974). He established a methodology which has been often used by 
subsequent papers, as it is founded on the principles of the efficient market hypothesis, and is 
able to efficiently and effectively calculate abnonnal returns. For this reason, I will be using 
his event-study methodology as a base for this thesis as well. However, it is not only his 
methodology which was significant, as he also found that insiders appear to possess special 
information, and are able to earn statistically significant abnormal returns based on that 
information. He also postulated that insiders may participate in gamesmanship trading, or 
camouflage trading in order to disguise any trades which may in fact hold special information 
from the market.
Further confirming the idea of insiders possessing special information, Scholes (1972) found 
in a study of securities prices after secondary offerings, that their prices fall. He attributed 
this to the issuer possessing inside information of an adverse nature. Scholes also postulated 
that since information acquisition costs are high, traders of larger blocks of shares should be 
basing trades on more valuable information than those traders who trade relatively little 
amounts of shares. Their trades are more likely to be attributable to, for example, portfolio 
adjustment. As a result, there should be a correlation between the size of the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) observed, and the size of the transaction. I intend to test the
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applicability of this correlation coefficient, which will be described later in the methodology 
section.
All of these cases provide strong evidence, that in a time when the markets were not in 
possession of as clear a picture of the company, insiders were viewed as having an ability to 
better forecast the future price of their firm, and therefore the changes they made in their 
ownership of the company was interpreted as a signal by the market, which then readjusted 
the price of the security.
3.2 Canadian Studies
The most recent study and most applicable to this one of Canadian insider trading (Smith & 
McNally 2003) studied the profitability and timing of the trades completed by insiders before 
2000. Their paper reported there is a correlation between insider purchases occurring before 
good, as well as bad news and insider sales. This gives good reason to believe that the 
average investor would have noticed this trend and used the insider trade information as a 
signal of future stock performance. However, this study covered a period in which insider 
reports were filed under the old laws that only required insider reports to be filed within 10 
days of the end of the month in which the trade occurred, potentially leaving a 40 day gap 
between an insider’s trade and public filing. The findings are significant in the context of this 
study, as it gives cause to believe that investors would consider insider trades as signals of 
future company performance. The nature of junior natural resource companies may very well 
amplify this effect, which is discussed in the company structure subsection. Although these 
results show that abnormal returns occur, it does not specify the results per industry and given 
the changes in the regulations since then, there is an opportunity to determine how this applies 
here.
Other Canadian studies (Baesel & Stein 1979, Lee & Bishara 1989, and Jabbour, Jalivand & 
Switzer 2000) have all also proven the existence of positive (negative) abnormal returns when 
insiders buy (sell) shares. However, the work of Basel & Stein (1979) covers trades made 
from 1968 to 1972 and focuses on the trades of insiders and bank directors of well established 
firms. Lee & Bishara (1989) compared insider buys during a bull market (March 1980 to 
May 1981) versus bear market sells and found that during bear conditions selling aided 
insiders to avoid abnormal losses. While experiencing bull market conditions, abnormal gains 
accrue to directors and bank directors.
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Jabbour, Jalilvand, & Switzer (2000) approached insider trading from the perspective of 
trades by insiders before take-over announcements in Canadian take-over target firms from 
1985 to 1995. Here again, insider trading as a form of price manipulation was named the 
culprit for early run up in the stock prices.
Glosten & Milgrom (1985) state that the market makers will suffer expected losses with 
trading with informed agents. Therefore the presence of insider trading in a stock causes the 
bid-ask spread to widen so that they may recoup their losses by trading with uniformed 
market participants. This suggests that trading by insiders should have a negative impact on 
the price of the stock by lowering its attractiveness to investors, and therefore lower firm 
value. However, in trading on the Canadian market, anyone can transact under the name 
anonymous in order to hide their identity. As a result, an insider can sell shares under the 
anonymous name, and no one would know with whom they had completed the trade until 
after its public disclosure. This means that the Canadian market makers may be forced to 
maintain a constant larger bid-ask spread than the natural level since they cannot know at any 
time which trades will executed by insiders and therefore would be loss making for the 
market makers, causing the lowered value of the company as a whole.
This also agrees with the theory presented by Jaffe (1974) with regards to insiders 
participating in gamesmanship trading, or camouflage trading. In practice, when trading, 
many securities firms will aggregate/disaggregate trades on their own as principals and then 
cross them in larger/smaller blocks to market participants. This a constant threat to the 
exchanges and one that has very little information published on it. The very sophisticated 
institutions also use algorithms to purchase and sell stocks in large liquid companies in an 
attempt to disguise their trading activities. Programmers are well advanced now on sniffing 
out such activities. However, this level of sophistication simply does not apply to JNR’s 
given their typically small capitalisations and associated lack of liquidity. Many institutions 
in the United States are also prohibited under their charters from purchasing shares with a 
price of less than $5.00. A JNR with a $5 share price is viewed, on a relative basis as being a 
“blue chip” by that time. This is important, because the U.S. is a significant source of the 
capital invested into the Canadian securities market, and has an influence in the size of the 
investor base participating in any given company.
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Table 2: Summary Results of Canadian Market Studies
The Chart below provides a brief quantitative summary of the results of the Canadian market based studies 
that were included in the literature review section above.
Author(s) Year Published Period Studied Observed Result
Smith & McNally 2003
(Working paper)
1987-2000 CAR at day zero for purchases
-0.8%, for sales 4.8%. At day 10, CAR for
purchases 0.2%, for sales -5.1%
Basel & Stein 1979 1968-1972 Ratio of Buys to sells: 58.7% to 41.3%. CAR 
after 12 months for buys (sells):
Bank directors 7.8% (-6.3%),
Ordinary Insiders 3.8% (-4.3%).
Lee & Bishara 1990 March 1980- 
May 1981
CAR for insider portfolios calculated for a 12 
month period. CAR observed for buy 
portfolios:
Directors: 1%, Senior Officers: 2.1%,
Bank Directors: 8.1%,
Beneficial Owners: 3.4%
CAR for insider sell portfolios:
Directors: -1.2%,
Senior Officers: -1.3%, Bank Directors: -6.2%, 
Beneficial Owners: -5.2%
Jabbour, Ja li vand & 
Switzer
2000 1985-1995 Cumulative abnormal returns after 25 days for 
net purchasers: 13.83%, 
for net sellers: -20.76%
3.3 More Recent American Literature
Trueman (1983) states that the fact that a manager is allowed to trade his stock suggests he 
may be withholding information for his own benefit and financial gain. In the context of this 
study, this may very well imply that the trades completed by managers in their own shares 
could be interpreted as an even greater signal to outside investors than according to other 
theories. This implies that not only may an insider be better informed, but that they may use 
that information in a manner that is malicious to shareholder value.
This agrees with a study completed by Meulbroek (1992) into insider trading that reveals 
insider trading (though it may be completed in complete anonymity) is detected, and that the 
market responds to trade-specific characteristics and incorporates private information. 
Though this was based on a range of industries in the US market, it could also be applicable 
here, as the tightly knit nature of JNRs lends itself well to the spread of information through
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informal channels (i.e. street gossip). Particularly in detecting large block trades which are 
usually associated with insiders, and could be detected by the market as such.
The findings of Masson & Madhavan (1991) support the concept that insider trading lowers 
firm value, but they also find that greater executive stock ownership raises the value. Their 
model was based on assuming inseparability factors, and that compensation, ownership and 
trading issues should be considered simultaneously in determining the significance of a trade. 
In a JNR executives are often given a large portion of their compensation in the form of 
options, warrants or shares as incentives to build value. Occasionally this may result in 
insiders holding extremely significant ownership positions of the company18. Theoretically, 
the findings of Masson & Madhavan (1991) should also hold true for JNRs, and in order to 
accurately quantify if they do, I will account for the size of insider trades as a proportion of 
their ownership, which will be discussed in the Methodology section. I firmly believe that 
this theory is applicable to JNRs because large stock ownership by management will most 
likely be seen as beneficial when potential investors are considering a company. This would 
make access to capital markets easier for these companies, which due to their size and the 
riskiness of their business, may otherwise find it nigh on impossible to find willing investors, 
or capital available at a reasonable price.
Keown, Pinkerton, & Bolster (1992) study asymmetrical information’s effects on trading 
volume in merger announcements. Though they consider only the effect on volume, and not 
on share price. They find that abnormal volume occurs prior to the announcement dates of 
either rumours or official press releases confirming a merger. This lends further confirmation 
to the theory of “street gossip” being a possible reality, and also offers a good model for 
abnormal volume measurement which will be discussed later in the methodology section.
18 Consider Aurelian and Liner Gold (both traded on the TSX Venture exchange). Both were nearly 50% owned 




The companies selected for this study were “active” mineral exploration companies between 
January 1st, 2002 and December 31st 2006 listed on the TSX Venture exchange. Companies 
were determined to be “active” if they had issued press releases of drill results at least once 
during the time period studied and their “Industry Group” was listed by SEDAR19 as being 
“Junior Natural Resource - Mining”. Only companies which were exclusively involved in 
mineral exploration with no other major assets or revenue streams were allowed20. As is the 
nature of the industry, once a JNR has discovered an economically feasible mineral deposit, 
they are often bought out by a major mining company which then puts the mine into 
production. As a result, not all of the companies studied necessarily existed for the entire 
length of the period used.
SEDI provides a registry of all transactions insiders make. In addition to outright purchases, 
sales of shares on the open market it also contains transfers of shares between an insider’s 
own accounts and all derivative based activities. This includes the grant of shares, as well as 
grant, exercise, and expiration of warrants and/or options. From these available registered 
transactions, I will use only those which involve a transaction of money for securities. Hence, 
of the indirect transactions (i.e., those which do not consist of open market trades with other 
participants) the exercise of options/warrants will be counted in the purchases category, and 
the remainder will not be included. The reason is that, except for the aforementioned 
transaction types, none of the remainder involves the investment or divestment of personal 
wealth in the company (such as a transfer of shares from one account belonging to an insider 
to another trading account held by the same individual).
19 SEDAR is the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval is a Canadian Securities 
Administrators run publicly accessible database into which all companies listed on a public exchange in Canada 
are legally required to file all press releases and regulated information.
20 This is an important step, as some of the JNR companies may also be involved in oil & gas activities that in 
some instances meant they were active microscale (less than 100 barrels of oil equivalent per day) producing 
operations. This meant they had some kind of revenue stream, and may no longer have possessed the ”lottery 
ticket” type of characteristics that are a core theme of the companies intended to be examined by this study.
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Although the award of options or shares may be seen as a positive method of rewarding a 
successful executive, I argue that it does not imply that that executive has any particular views 
regarding the future of the company; rather it is simply a method of granting compensation 
for work completed or as an incentive to retain his services in the face of a very severe 
shortage of management personnel. Furthermore, including the grant of options or shares in 
the study would not be correct, as any such grants are announced publicly in a press release 
prior to their actual occurrence. Therefore, any information contained in this grant would 
already be incorporated into the price of the share well before the grant date. Such 
transactions should therefore not have any abnormal volume or returns associated with them, 
and thus as “non-event” transactions their abnormal volume or returns results would create an 
incorrect measurement in the abnormal volume or returns for potentially information 
possessing insider trades.
4.2 Abnormal Returns Formulae
The CAR for this study will be counted for the period of t=-5 days prior to an insider’s trade, 
up to r=+15 days post trade. This is necessary since it allows us to observe the any changes 
in the share’s price before the transaction (such as run-ups, run-downs etc.), and also during 
the period after the transaction has occurred but before it becomes publicly disclosed, as well 
as after it is disclosed to the general public on SEDI. The CAR will be calculated using the 
following formula which is constructed on the market-adjusted model of Jaffe (1974):
CAR„ = j]Rlr-(a + Rm,)
t=-T
Where:
RmT is computed using the market return of the S&P/TSX Venture exchange index.
The result of (1) represents the difference of the measured return of the security and the 
measured return of the market. This difference between the two parts of the equation is the 
abnormal return on the security, which is attributable to the influence of the trades completed 
by an insider’s transaction on the stock.
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I will also analyse which corporate position has the greatest effect on the price of the 
company. This will be divided into: senior officers, outside directors, large shareholders, and 
other insider(s). SEDI divides insiders according to a different set of categories, which have 
been sorted to fit into those which I will use. The original SEDI categories and my 
equivalents can be found below in Table 3.
Table 3: Equivalents of SEDI’s Insider’s Relationship to Issuer
The official SEDI categories for insiders which are used in the source information for this study and are found 
on the SEDI online database are presented in the right hand side column with my equivalent categories shown 
on the left hand side of the table. The categories relating to Other insiders have been bundled together as all 
subsidiaries related categories will be used very infrequently, as JNRs very rarely have subsidiaries.
Insider's Relationship to Issuer 
Equivalent Used in This Study
Insider Categories According to SEDI Database
Other insider( s) 1 - Issuer
Other insider(s) 2 - Subsidiary of Issuer
Large Shareholder 3 - 10% Security Holder of Issuer
Director of Issuer 4 - Director of Issuer
Senior Officer 5 - Senior Officer of Issuer
Large Shareholder 6 - Director or Senior Officer of 10% Security Holder
Other insider(s) 7 - Director or Senior Officer of Insider or Subsidiary of Issuer (other 
than in 4,5,6)
Other insider(s) 8 - Deemed Insider - 6 Months before becoming Insider
4.3 Abnormal Volume Formulae
In order to better understand the price reactions that are taking place surrounding the trades by 
insiders, I also complete an analysis of the abnormal volume that occurs. The structure of this 
analysis is based on that of Keown, Pinkerton & Bolster (1992) and is much like that of the 
abnormal returns analysis of Jaffe (1974). It will be counted for the same event window of r= 
-5 days prior to an insider’s trade, up to r=+15 days post trade and using the formula for 
cumulative abnormal volume (CAV):
c^K, = iv-(a+KA (2)
r=-T
Where:
VmT is computed using the percentage of the total number of shares issued and outstanding on the 
TSX-V that are traded during each day.
Vj, is calculated as the percentage of total amount of the company’s shares issued and 
outstanding that are traded on each day.
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The result of (2) represents the difference between the trade volume of the market overall 
versus the security for which the calculation is made. Any statistically significant deviation 
from zero is attributable to trading activity surrounding the trades completed by an insider’s 
transaction.
4.4 Statistical Analysis Formulae & Other Calculations
In accordance with the concept of Masson & Madhavan (1991), and Scholes (1972) I also 
intend to examine the correlation between the cumulative abnormal returns generated, and 
would have liked to compare it to the size of the trade completed in proportion to the holdings 
of the insider. Ideally, this would be completed by determining a correlation coefficient 
between the amount of stock traded (as a percentage of the insider’s holdings) in relation to 
the size of the abnormal returns occurring after that trade. However, SEDI’s data for total 
insider holdings was incomplete, and this could not be used as a basis for comparison. In its 
stead, I have decided to use a proxy of this proportion, by comparing the number of shares 
traded to the number of the company’s shares outstanding. Though this does not perfectly 
capture the picture of the trade’s relationship to the insider’s position as originally intended, it 
gives us a good glimpse of the magnitude of each trade. By comparing the trade in this 
manner, we benefit by being able to compare the actual size of the trades completed by 
insiders in relation to other categories of insiders and get a better view of which category 
trades the largest proportion of the company’s shares. The correlation coefficient will be 
calculated using equation (3).
Hence:
Px ,r
Щх- F,)(/•- Иг)) (3)
Where X is Shares traded
number of shares issued
., and r is the cumulative abnormal return resulting from the shares sold.
For example, it would seem reasonable to think that the sale of 0.1% of the company’s 
outstanding shares by an executive would cause less abnonnal returns than if they were to 
dispose of 1% of the company’s shares. The size of the trade would also be expected to 
correlate to the significance of the information on which the trade is made; hence the smallest 
trades are most likely to be portfolio rebalancing, while trades towards the other end of the
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size spectrum are most likely to contain information related to the future potential of the firm, 
as proposed by Jaffe (1974). Therefore, the significance of the size of the trade should be 
reflected in the size of the market reaction to that trade, resulting in a correlation.
It also follows logically, that if insider trading increases the accuracy of securities prices, they 
abnormal returns occurring on days of trades by insiders should have the same sign (either 
positive or negative) as the day on which that insider trade becomes public information. 
Hence, this should cause a move towards a price level that reflects the information’s 
incorporation into the stock’s price.
The stock price data of each company has been acquired from DataStream, and the insider 
trading files have been acquired from SEDI. SEDI is the electronic registry of all insider 
trades for Canadian securities.
In order to determine the ease with which a theoretical 9.9% stakeholder could liquidate their 
position, I intend to measure the percentage of the company’s shares that are traded between 
day 0 and +10. This will be completed by summing the volume of shares traded during those 
days, and subtracting the insider trade’s traded share amount from that sum.
To test if the results on insider trading days are significantly different from zero, I will use 
two tests. First, the t-test to see if the daily and cumulative abnormal returns and volumes 
differ from zero, using the cross-sectional standard error calculated from the abnormal 





Standard error is represented by the formula:
Standard error = (5)
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Secondly, the z-statistic tests to see if the mean cumulative abnormal return on insider trading 
days differs from zero. The Z statistic is a cumulative standard prediction error (CPSE). Its 
equation is shown below:
Z - stat = (6)
Where:
S¡ is the variance of the portfolio 
К is the number of insider trading events








Lj is the estimation period in days
Rm,t is the return on the market
Rm is the return on the security
Sj is the standard error over the entire period
The Z statistic is used because it captures some information that the t-statistic may miss since 
it weighs the individual coefficients by their preciseness. The Z statistic’s incorporation of 
the individual S¡ coefficients is important in considering the mean insider trading CAR
because the magnitude of the CAR may not be evenly distributed over the course of the 
period in which cumulative abnormal returns are calculated. For example, an episode of 10% 
CAR accumulating evenly over the course of the entire period would not be as unusual as if it 
were to have that same 10%, but with 9% of that occurring in one day21.
21 For further information on the Z statistic, please refer to Warner, Watts, & Wruck (1988) as well as Dodd and 
Warner (1983)
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5 Results and Discussion
Disclosing issuers were filtered in SEDAR according to the criteria explained in the 
methodology section, and 320 matching companies were found. Of these, 6 companies were 
rejected, as they owned properties related to oil and gas exploration in addition to a main 
portfolio of mineral mining properties. One additional company was eliminated from the 
group, as it had just recently been listed, and no insider trading of its securities had yet been 
registered with SEDI.
For the 313 companies that were accepted to be studied, 31,269 trades were recorded during 
the period of January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2006. Of those trades, cumulative abnormal 
returns calculations could only be completed for 31,047. There were 222 trades for which a 
date of transaction was erroneously recorded as having taken place on a public holiday. The 
TSX Venture exchange is not open for trade on public holidays, and the correct trade date 
remained undeterminable. Of the trades for which abnormal returns was calculated, 15,264 
were purchases by insiders, while 15,566 were insider sales, resulting in a nearly 50% 
purchases, and 50% sales split, which is similar to the results obtained by Basel & Stein 
(1979) of 58.7% and 41.3%. The results are visible in the summary statistics Table 4. 
Returns for the transactions were volatile with standard deviations of on average 17.53% and 
19.84% for purchases and sales respectively, and had CAR values that rose or fell by large 
amounts from one day to the next, resulting in the extreme high and low values of the 
maximum and minimum respectively. From Table 4, we can see that the vast majority of all 
trades (72.26%) were completed by senior officers of the company, followed in a distant 
second place by large shareholders at 16.03%.
Z-Statistics for this data set do not provide any useful additional information. None of the 
data was statistically significant and as such the Z-statistics results have been omitted.
The only outcome in this table that was out of line with expectations is the correlation 
coefficient, which shows that in neither purchases nor sales of shares, are the amount of 
shares traded related to the size of the cumulative abnormal returns recorded for each 
transaction, which is explored further in subsection Low Correlation of the discussion section.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Canadian Junior Natural Resources Firms 2002-2006
This table is presents the summary statistics sand results of the event study analysis. The figures for summary 
statistics are drawn from the values on day +15. Hence, they represent the distribution of the final measured 
day’s cumulative abnormal returns results. As a result of the disparity between the number of transactions 
occurring in each category, these are all weighted values. Under the heading By Category is a count of the 
number of observations for each category of insider, separated for purchases and sales. CAR to Amount traded 
Correlation Coefficient is the coefficient of correlation that was determined to exist between the magnitude of 
the observed abnormal returns of day+15. Their confidence levels are given here as numbers instead of being 
marked by stars, to show that not only are these results not within a range of high confidence, but are in fact
Insider Purchases Insider Sales
Distribution of Final Values on Day +15
Mean 1.73 % -3.33 %
Median 1.71 % -3.51 %
Standard Deviation 17.53 % 19.84%
95th percentile 27.28 % 30.73 %
5 th percentile -26.82 % -29.13 %
Minimum value -45.08 % -415.57%
Max value 241.26% 89.70 %
Total Number of Observations 15,264 15,566
Number of Observations By Category:
Senior Officer 10,738 11,697
Director of Issuer 1,190 1,375
Large Shareholder 3,141 1,872
Other insiderfs) 195 622
Correlation Between CAR and Percentage of Company Traded
Correlation coefficient 0.01 -0.01
T Statistic 0.74 -1.11
Confidence Level 54.08 % 73.31 %
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Table 5: Summary of Trade Volumes
This table outlines figures obtained in relation to the volumes traded by insiders and around the insider 
transaction date. The percentage proportion of the insider’s total holdings of the firm’s shares for each category 
of insider, separated for purchases and sales. The Average percentage of company's shares traded during 90 
days preceding transaction is the 90 day average of the company’s shares traded as a percentage of all 
outstanding shares prior to the transaction date. The Average Percentage of Company's Shares Traded 
Between 0 and +10 is the average of the total percentage of the company’s shares traded during the ten days 
between the occurrence of the insider transaction, and the official disclosure of the information on SEDI for 
each category of insider, separated for purchases and sales. Average percentage of company's shares traded by 
insider is the average portion of the company’s total outstanding shares traded by the insider in a single 
transaction for each category of insider, separated for purchases and sales. Confidence levels are indicated with 
stars as follows: 90%*, 95%**, 99%***
Insider Purchases Insider Sales
Average percentage of company's shares traded during 90 days preceding transaction
Senior Officer 0.30 % 0.41 %
Director of Issuer 0.21 % 0.31 %
Large Shareholder 0.13% 0.18%
Other insider(s) 0.12% 0.10%
Average percentage of company's shares traded between 0 and +10 per day
Senior Officer 0.36 % * 0.49 % **
Director of Issuer 0.24 % *** 0.39 % ***
Large Shareholder 0.17% *** 0.27 % ***
Other insider(s) 0.18% ** 0.30 % ***
Average percentage of company' s shares traded by insider
Senior Officer 0.26 % 0.13 %
Director of Issuer 0.17 % 0.10 %
Large Shareholder 0.45 % 0.30 %
Other insider(s) 0.06 % 0.01 %
From the amount of shares traded between 0 and +10, we can also conclude that a theoretical 
9.9% non-reporting stakeholder would not be able to liquidate their entire position prior to the 
public dissemination of an insider’s trade. Such a 9.9% holder could only sell at most 1% to 
4% of the company’s shares, which is just a fraction of their position. Realistically, even then 
it would be highly unlikely that they could act as the sole seller on the market, and would 
probably be able to act as the selling party in only a portion of the trades completed in any 
given day.
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______________ Figure 5: Distribution of Trades on an Annual Basis______________
This figure illustrates the count of transaction occurrences per day throughout the period studied of 2002- 
2006. From the relatively even distribution we can interpret that there is very little to no seasonality in the 
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In Figure 5, we can see the distribution of the timing of trading. Analysis of the timing of 
trading completed by insiders shows the seasonality of insider trades is low. There is no 
particular time of year in which insiders are more likely to be actively trading than any other 
time of the year. Though we cannot extract information related specifically to the flow­
through shares mentioned earlier in section two, we can conclude that overall insiders are not 
specifically selling or purchasing shares in large quantities for tax purposes at the beginning 
and end of the year.
Figures 6 and 7 display the CAR results for each transaction date. From them, we can see that 
on average, for both buys and sells, the CAR was nearly flat during the period from -5 to 0, 
and was not statistically significantly different from zero. The CAV also followed a similar 
pattern, as it was on average not statistically significant. The CAR observed from 0 to +10, 
on the other hand, followed an increasing slope for purchases as Figure 6, and a decreasing 
slope for sales in Figure 7. The t-test calculations for the CAR on these days showed that on 
average they were statistically significant, and that they did not constitute points that could 
have occurred as statistical anomalies. The data recorded for days +10 to +15 showed another 
spike in CAR as the information regarding the trade was made public, in most curves on day 
+10, and followed by a decline or levelling out of CAR by day 15. These dates also had daily 
abnormal volume levels which were significant.
32
Figure 6: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Purchases
This figure better illustrates the results for insider purchases shown in Table 6, as it shows the immediate 
reaction to insider purchases in all insider categories beginning immediately after day 0, along with the run-up 

















________________ Figure 7: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Sales________________
This figure better illustrates the results for insider sales originally in Table 7, as it shows the variable reaction 
to insider purchases in all insider categories starting on day 0, notably, the particularly sever reaction to sales 

















Tables 6 to 13 which appear on the following pages display the results for price and volume 
changes both cumulatively and per day for each category of insider and for purchases and 
sales separately. From this data, we can conclude that the hypothesis of no abnormal returns 
is rejected, as statistically significant abnormal returns and volume do occur as a result of 
insider trading. As the null is rejected, support builds for the hypothesis that the markets do 
react to insider trading. This implies that insider trading information is not kept confidential 
until its official release date, meaning that “street gossip” does in fact occur, and that the 
market regards different categories of insiders to possess information of different values.
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Table 6: Cumulative Abnormal Performance of Shares Within -5 and +15 Days of 
______________________________ Insider Purchases______________________________
This table lists the cumulative abnormal returns for insider purchases occurring up to and including the date 
measured for each category of insider and for the weighted average. These measurements have been taken at 
each day from 5 days prior to the transaction through 15 days subsequent to the transaction. Underneath each 
date is the associated T-statistic, and its corresponding significance as noted by stars. Significance is noted as: 
90% *, 95% **, 99% ***. The Т-Statistic for the average is calculated based on the standard error for the entire 
distribution up to and including the given date.
Day Senior Officer Director of Issuer Large Shareholder Other insider(s) Average
-5 -0.44 % -0.05 % -0.04 % 1.06% -0.31 %
-0.60 -0.21 -0.09 1.28 0.63
-4 -0.40 % -0.17% -0.19% 2.21 % -0.31 %
-0.54 -0.60 -0.38 2.67 *** 1.49
-3 0.07 % 0.11 % 0.05 % 0.77 % 0.08 %
0.20 0.36 0.09 0.93 0.95
-2 0.24 % 0.00 % -0.31 % 1.24% 0.12 %
0.65 0.00 -0.52 1.50 1.05
-1 0.95 % 0.13% 0.49 % 0.82 % 0.79 %
2.58 ** 0.36 0.79 0.99 2.03 **
0 1.15% 0.09 % 0.06 % 3.63 % 0.88 %
3.10 *** 0.24 0.10 441 *** 4.01 ***
1 1.21 % 0.15% 0.24 % 2.54 % 0.95 %
3 27 *** 0.39 0.37 3.08 *** 3.28 ***
2 0.93 % 0.06 % 0.62 % 1.90% 0.81 %
2.51 ** 0.15 0.92 2.30 ** 2.71 ***
3 0.88 % 0.09 % 1.05% 1.61 % 0.86 %
2.37 ** 0.22 1.54 1.95 * 2.76 ***
4 0.68 % 0.11 % 1.25% 1.71 % 0.77 %
1.83 * 0.26 1.79 * 2.07 ** 2.81 ***
5 1.06% 0.06 % 1.18% 1.93 % 1.02 %
2.87 *** 0.16 1.65 * 2 34 ** 3.11
6 0.51 % 0.19% 1.19% 1.58 % 0.64 %
1.37 0.47 1.65 * 1.91 * 2.51 **
7 0.59 % 0.26 % 1.71 % 2.14% 0.81 %
1.59 0.62 2.34 ** 2.59 ** 3.35 ***
8 0.57 % 0.51 % 1.79% 2.85 % 0.85 %
1.54 1.20 2.42 ** 3 45 *** 4.05 ***
9 0.42 % 0.78 % 1.91 % 2.73 % 0.78 %
1.12 1.83 * 2.56 ** 3 3i *** 4.08 ***
10 0.07 % 0.90 % 1.86% 2.74 % 0.54 %
0.19 2.08 ** 2.48 ** 3 32 *** 3.85 ***
11 0.67 % 1.20% 2.26 % 2.04 % 1.06 %
1.81 * 2.73 *** 2.98 *** 2.47 ** 4.22 ***
12 1.25% 1.30% 2.62 % 2.87 % 1.56 %
3 38 *** 2.88 *** 3 4Q *** 3 47 *** 5.36 ***
13 1.56% 1.29% 2.90 % 2.22 % 1.82 %
4 20 *** 2.75 *** 3 72 *** 2 70 *** 5.15 ***
14 1.30% 1.43 % 2.83 % 1.67% 1.63 %
3.50 *** 3.01 *** 3.60 *** 2.02 ** 4.62 ***
15 1.33% 1.59% 3.15 % 1.61 % 1.73 %
3.58 *** 3 34 *** 4 00 *** 1.96 * 4.90 ***
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Table 7: Cumulative Abnormal Performance of Shares Within -5 and +15 Days of 
________________________________ Insider Sales________________________________
This table lists the cumulative abnormal returns for insider sales occurring up to and including the date measured 
for each category of insider and for the weighted average. These measurements have been taken at each day 
from 5 days prior to the transaction through 15 days subsequent to the transaction. Underneath each date is the 
associated T-statistic, and its corresponding significance as noted by stars. Significance is noted as: 90% *, 95% 
**, 99% ***. The Т-Statistic for the average is calculated based on the standard error for the entire distribution 
up to and including the given date.
Day Senior Officer Director of Issuer Large Shareholder Other insider(s) Average
-5 -0.37 % -0.16% -0.43 % 0.01 % -0.35 %
-0.55 -0.68 -0.72 0.01 -1.75 *
-4 0.73 % -0.05 % -0.47 % -4.26 % 0.32 %
0.88 -0.17 -0.70 -4.75 *** 1.40
-3 0.84 % 0.18% -0.46 % -1.00% 0.55 %
0.94 0.57 -0.59 -1.11 2.23 **
-2 1.37% 0.43 % -0.53 % 1.69% 1.07 %
1.44 1.32 -0.63 1.88 * 4.05 ***
-1 1.84% 0.69 % -0.48 % -5.64 % 1.16 %
1.78 * 1.95 * -0.56 -6.29 *** 4.17 ***
0 2.36 % 1.69% -1.32% -6.41 % 1.51 %
2.14 ** 4 45 *** -1.39 -7.15 *** 5.05 ***
1 2.27 % 1.45% -1.44 % -1.89% 1.58 %
1.98 ** 3.76 *** -1.53 -2.11 ** 5.22 ***
2 -0.94 % 1.15 % -1.54% -4.91 % -0.99 %
-0.82 2 gi *** -1.63 -5.48 *** -3.23 ***
3 -0.90 % 1.01 % -1.59% -8.52 % -1.12 %
-0.77 2.50 ** -1.64 -9.50 *** -3.59 ***
4 -0.41 % 0.73 % -2.03 % -12.79 % -1.00 %
-0.35 1.76 * -2.06 ** -4.27 *** -3.15 ***
5 -0.17% 0.59 % -2.17% -12.37 % -0.83 %
-0.15 1.37 -2.18 ** -3.80 *** -2.59 ***
6 -0.77 % 0.64 % -2.30 % -11.19% -1.25 %
-0.64 1.47 -2.29 ** -3.48 *** -3.83 ***
7 -1.11 % 0.21 % -2.42 % -15.58 % -1.73 %
-0.92 0.47 -2.41 ** -7.38 *** -5.28 ***
8 -1.11 % -0.18% -2.56 % -13.55 % -1.70 %
-0.90 -0.41 -2.54 ** -5.12 *** -5.13 ***
9 -1.53 % -0.31 % -2.81 % -12.74 % -2.03 %
-1.25 -0.68 -2 70 *** -4.22 *** -3.04 ***
10 -2.66 % -0.45 % -4.01 % -12.56 % -3.02 %
-2.13 ** -1.00 -3.80 *** -4.02 *** -6.93 ***
11 -4.64 % -0.87 % -4.03 % -10.94% -4.49 %
-3.68 *** -1.90 * -3 77 *** -4.21 *** -3.12 ***
12 -3.28 % -0.94 % -5.11 % -12.22% -3.65 %
-2.57 ** -2.05 ** -4 74 *** -6.64 *** -5.60 ***
13 -3.20 % -1.17% -5.25 % -10.80 % -3.57 %
-2.50 ** -2.53 ** -4.80 *** -7.05 *** -6.30 ***
14 -3.41 % -1.11 % -5.12% -9.58 % -3.66 %
-2.64 *** -2.39 ** -4 70 *** -10.69 *** -10.51 ***
15 -2.85 % -1.23 % -5.33 % -10.98 % -3.33 %
-2.21 ** -2.64 ** -4.88 *** -10.25 *** -9.56 ***
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Table 8: Daily Abnormal Performance of Shares Within -5 and +15 Days of Insider 
_________________________________ Purchases_________________________________
This table lists the daily abnormal returns for insider purchases occurring up to and including the date measured 
for each category of insider and for the weighted average. These measurements have been taken at each day 
from 5 days prior to the transaction through 15 days subsequent to the transaction. Underneath each date is the 
associated T-statistic, and its corresponding significance as noted by stars. Significance is noted as: 90% *, 
95% **, 99% ***. The Т-Statistic for the average is calculated based on the standard error for the distribution 
of all transactions occurring on that day.
Day Senior Officer Director of Issuer Large Shareholder Other insider(s) Average
-5 -0.44 % -0.05 % -0.04 % 1.06% -0.32 %
-0.60 -0.21 -0.09 0.65 -1.57
-4 0.04 % -0.12% -0.16% 1.15% -0.01 %
0.06 -0.46 -0.33 0.70 -0.05
-3 0.47 % 0.28 % 0.24 % -1.44% 0.37 %
0.60 1.08 0.51 -0.88 1.71
-2 0.17% -0.11 % -0.36 % 0.47 % 0.03 %
0.22 -0.44 -0.77 0.29 0.16
-1 0.71 % 0.13 % 0.80 % -0.43 % 0.66 %
0.90 0.47 1.67 * -0.26 2.93
0 0.20 % -0.04 % -0.42 % 2.82 % 0.04 %
0.23 -0.12 -0.83 1.72 * 0.17
1 0.06 % 0.06 % 0.18% -1.09% 0.07 %
0.08 0.21 0.38 -0.67 0.33
2 -0.28 % 0.09 % 0.37 % -0.65 % -0.13 %
-0.37 -0.33 0.79 -0.39 -0.60
3 -0.05 % 0.03 % 0.44 % -0.29 % 0.04 %
-0.06 0.10 0.94 -0.18 0.20
4 -0.20 % 0.02 % 0.20 % 0.10% -0.11 %
-0.25 0.07 0.44 0.06 -0.49
5 0.38 % 0.04 % -0.08 % 0.22 % 0.25 %
0.49 -0.16 -0.16 0.14 1.14
6 -0.56 % 0.13% 0.02 % -0.35 % -0.40 %
-0.74 0.50 0.04 -0.22 -1.86
7 0.08 % 0.07 % 0.51 % 0.56 % 0.15 %
0.10 0.26 1.10 0.34 0.71
8 -0.02 % 0.25 % 0.09 % 0.72 % 0.00 %
-0.02 0.95 0.19 0.44 -0.02
9 -0.15% 0.28 % 0.12% -0.13% -0.09 %
-0.21 1.06 0.25 -0.08 -0.43
10 -0.35 % 0.12 % -0.06 % 0.01 % -0.26 %
-0.46 0.46 -0.12 0.01 -1.22
11 0.60 % 0.29 % 0.41 % -0.70 % 0.50 %
0.81 1.14 0.84 -0.43 2.29
12 0.58 % 0.10% 0.35 % 0.83 % 0.47 %
0.78 0.39 0.52 0.51 1.94
13 0.30 % -0.01 % 0.29 % -0.64 % 0.26 %
0.39 -0.02 0.37 -0.39 1.00
14 -0.26 % -0.14% -0.07 % -0.55 % -0.21 %
-0.35 -0.53 -0.15 -0.34 -0.96
15 0.03 % 0.16% 0.32 % -0.06 % 0.08 %
0.04 0.63 0.67 -0.03 0.37
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Table 9: Daily Abnormal Performance of Shares Within -5 and +15 Days of Insider 
___________________________________ Sales___________________________________
This table lists the daily abnormal returns for insider sales occurring up to and including the date measured for 
each category of insider and for the weighted average. These measurements have been taken at each day from 
5 days prior to the transaction through 15 days subsequent to the transaction. Underneath each date is the 
associated T-statistic, and its corresponding significance as noted by stars. Significance is noted as: 90% *, 
95% **, 99% ***. The Т-Statistic for the average is calculated based on the standard error for the distribution 
of all transactions occurring on that day.
Day Senior Officer Director of Issuer Large Shareholder Other insider(s) Average
-5 -0.37 % -0.16% -0.43 % 0.01 % -0.35 %
-0.55 -0.68 -0.72 0.01 -1.70
-4 1.10% 0.11 % -0.05 % -4.27 % 0.66 %
1.42 0.45 -0.08 -4.29 *** 3.03
-3 0.11 % 0.22 % 0.01 % 3.26% 0.24 %
0.16 0.86 0.02 3.08 *** 1.06
-2 0.53 % 0.26 % -0.07 % 2.68 % 0.52 %
0.73 1.02 -0.11 2.59 *** 2.36
-1 0.47 % 0.25 % 0.05 % -7.33 % 0.09 %
0.60 0.97 0.08 -7.00 *** 0.38
0 0.52 % 1.00% -0.84 % -0.77 % 0.35 %
0.64 3.53 *** -1.01 -0.64 1.39
1 -0.09 % -0.23 % -0.13 % 4.51 % 0.08 %
-0.12 -0.94 -0.19 4.25 *** 0.35
2 -3.21 % -0.30 % -0.10% -3.01 % -2.57 %
-4 39 *** -1.16 -0.17 -2.86 *** -2.94
3 0.04 % -0.14% -0.04 % -3.61 % -0.13 %
0.06 -0.55 -0.06 -3.72 *** -0.60
4 0.49 % -0.28 % -0.45 % -4.27 % 0.12 %
0.71 -1.00 -0.65 -4.53 *** 0.51
5 0.24 % -0.14% -0.14% 0.41 % 0.16 %
0.35 -0.51 -0.24 0.42 0.70
6 -0.60 % 0.05 % -0.12% 1.18 % -0.41 %
-0.88 0.22 -0.21 1.32 -2.01
7 -0.34 % -0.43 % -0.12% -4.39 % -0.48 %
-0.50 -1.80 * -0.19 -4.53 *** -2.32
8 0.00 % -0.39 % -0.14% 2.02 % 0.03 %
0.00 -0.87 -0.14 1.28 0.08
9 -0.42 % -0.12% -0.25 % 0.81 % -0.33 %
-0.61 -0.52 -0.41 0.74 -1.57
10 -1.12% -0.15% -1.20% 0.18 % -0.99 %
-1.57 -0.61 -2.03 ** 0.17 -4.80
11 -1.99% -0.41 % -0.02 % 1.62 % -1.47 %
-2.75 *** -1.71 * -0.03 1.66 * -7.00
12 1.36% -0.08 % -1.08 % -1.28% 0.84 %
1.89 * -0.32 -1.79 * -1.26 4.00
13 0.08 % -0.22 % -0.14% 1.42% 0.08 %
0.12 -0.94 -0.21 1.35 0.39
14 -0.21 % 0.06 % 0.13% 1.22% -0.09 %
-0.31 0.24 0.21 1.24 -0.42
15 0.55 % -0.12% -0.21 % -1.40% 0.33 %
0.75 -0.51 -0.33 -1.43 1.57
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Table 10: Cumulative Abnormal Transaction Volume of Shares Within -5 and +15 
__________________________ Days of Insider Purchases__________________________
This table lists the cumulative abnormal transaction volume of shares for insider purchases occurring up to and 
including the date measured for each category of insider and for the weighted average. These measurements 
have been taken at each day from 5 days prior to the transaction through 15 days subsequent to the transaction. 
Underneath each date is the associated T-statistic, and its corresponding significance as noted by stars. 
Significance is noted as: 90% *, 95% **, 99% ***. The Т-Statistic for the average is calculated based on the 
standard error for the entire distribution up to and including the given date.
Day Senior Officer Director of Issuer Large Shareholder Other msider(s) Average
-5 -0.09 % -0.11 % -0.07% -0.11 % -0.08 %
-2.64 *** -1.26 -0.70 -0.94 -1.09
-4 -0.19% 0.23 % -0.21 % 0.04 % -0.15 %
-5.20 *** 2.53 ** -0.98 0.99 -1.95
-3 0.29% -0.13% -0.30 % -0.05 % 0.13 %
6.58 *** -1.77 * -2.07 ** -0.12 1.63
-2 0.06 % 0.07 % -0.07 % -0.16% 0.02 %
1.06 0.76 -2.11 ** -2.68 *** 1.38
-1 0.28 % 0.46 % -0.06 % 0.27 % 0.23 %
4.54 *** 2.52 ** -1.73 * 1.53 1.65 *
0 0.68 % 0.54 % 0.04 % 0.40 % 0.60 %
2.46 ** 4.55 *** 2.63 *** 1.86 * 3.92
1 -0.18% 0.58 % 0.85 % 0.97 % 0.12 %
-2.91 *** 3.46 **♦ 4.98 *** 2.67 *** 1.57 **
2 0.27 % 0.91 % 0.26 % 1.03 % 0.35 %
3.71 *** 4.68 *** 1.18 2.98 *** 4.66
3 0.53 % 1.20% 0.65 % 1.16% 0.63 %
1.97 ** 4.70 2.88 *** 3.78 *** 2.99 ***
4 0.19% 0.46 % 1.04% 0.38 % 0.38 %
2.37 ** 2.37 ** 2.78 *** 3.46 *** 2.55 **
5 0.20 % 0.79 % 1.37% 0.39 % 0.47 %
2.29 ** 3.31 *** 3.66 *** 1.63 2.97 *
6 0.37 % 1.16% 0.92 % 0.56 % 0.54 %
4.11 *** 4.52 *** 2.47 *** 1.93 * 5.51 **
7 0.11 % 0.45 % 1.40% 0.68 % 1.05 %
3.47 *** 4.61 *** 3.73 *** 1.73 * 4.65 ***
8 0.72 % 0.88 % 0.88 % 0.87 % 0.77 %
7.50 *** 4.05 ♦ ** 2.33 * 2.60 *** 3.39 ***
9 0.62 % 0.87 % 0.70 % 0.64 % 0.65 %
5.94 *** 4.43 *** 1.67 *** 1.63 5.69 **
10 0.53 % 0.73 % 1.33 % 1.32 % 0.73 %
4.72 *** 3.78 *** 3.14 *** 3.33 *** 3.00 ***
11 0.57 % 1.18 % 1.65 % 0.80 % 0.83 %
5.25 *** 4.68 *** 3.87 *** 1.99 ** 3.41 ***
12 0.86 % 0.64 % 2.32 % 1.10% 1.13 %
7.28 *** 4.70 *** 5.96 *** 2.73 *** 4.86 ***
13 1.17% 1.01 % 1.99% 1.39% 1.32 %
5.70 *** 5.96 *** 5.75 *** 3.43 5.86 ***
14 1.40% 1.39% 2.75 % 0.60 % 1.61 %
4.98 6.39 *** 5.87 *** 1.60 4.52 ***
15 1.59% 1.68% 3.08 % 0.76 % 1.84 %
3.91 *** 5.20 *** 6.17 *** 1.24 4.25 ***
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Table 11: Cumulative Abnormal Transaction Volume of Shares Within -5 and +15 
____________________________ Days of Insider Sales____________________________
This table lists the cumulative abnormal transaction volume of shares for insider sales occurring up to and 
including the date measured for each category of insider and for the weighted average. These measurements 
have been taken at each day from 5 days prior to the transaction through 15 days subsequent to the transaction. 
Underneath each date is the associated T-statistic, and its corresponding significance as noted by stars. 
Significance is noted as: 90% *, 95% **, 99% ***. The Т-Statistic for the average is calculated based on the 
standard error for the entire distribution up to and including the given date.
Day Senior Officer Director of Issuer Large Shareholder Other insider(s) Average
-5 -0.13 % -0.05 % -0.05 % 0.04 % -0.10 %
-0.52 -0.62 -1.98 ** 1.15 -0.58
-4 0.24 % -0.08 % -0.16% -0.04 % 0.15 %
1.00 -0.96 -0.88 -0.96 0.82
-3 0.23 % 0.47 % -0.27 % 0.15 % 0.19 %
0.48 2.13 ** -1.36 0.46 1.17
-2 0.09 % 0.05 % 0.43 % -0.41 % 0.10 %
1.76 * 0.58 1.92 * -1.29 0.42
-1 0.36 % 0.21 % 0.54 % 0.73 % 0.38 %
1.84 * 2.45 ** 2.66 *** 2.01 ** 1.65 *
0 0.41 % 0.34 % 0.49 % 0.71 % 0.43 %
1.68 * 3.34 *** 2.43 ** 1.96 * 1.63
1 0.36 % 0.64 % 0.39 % 1.14% 0.42 %
1.46 3.16 *** 2.06 ** 3.10 *** 2.26 **
2 0.48 % 1.01 % 0.20 % 1.47% 0.54 %
1.91 * 5.51 *** 2.88 *** 4.82 *** 2.87 ***
3 0.44 % 1.24% 0.44 % 0.74 % 0.53 %
2.00 ** 4.46 *** 1.88 * 2.25 ** 2.80 ***
4 0.14% 0.56 % 1.66% 0.64 % 0.37 %
1.64 1.99 ** 2.33 ** 1.94 * 1.98 **
5 0.34 % 0.74 % 1.84% 0.31 % 0.54 %
3.79 *** 2.56 ** 2.74 *** 2.95 *** 1.74 *
6 0.58 % 1.05% 1.15% 0.48 % 0.68 %
0.87 3.77 *** 1.97 ** 1.56 2.17 **
7 0.89 % 1.38% 1.42% 0.87 % 1.00 %
1.10 4.98 *** 2.25 ** 2.58 *** 3.17 ***
8 0.82 % 0.84 % 1.71 % 0.96 % 0.93 %
7.98 *** 3.01 *** 2.70 *** 2.55 ** 2.97 ***
9 0.70 % 0.84 % 1.08% 0.33 % 0.74 %
6.44 *** 3.01 *** 1.71 * 2.74 *** 2.39 **
10 0.62 % 0.57 % 1.34% 0.56 % 0.70 %
5.46 *** 2.04 ** 2.11 ** 4.60 *** 2.89 ***
11 0.54 % 0.92 % 1.74% 0.79 % 0.73 %
4.65 *** 3.30 *** 4.39 *** 6.32 *** 3.01 ***
12 0.95 % 1.30% 2.12% 0.93 % 1.11 %
7.53 *** 4.66 *** 3.13 *** 1.70 * 4.88 ***
13 1.35% 0.76 % 2.39 % 1.16% 1.41 %
1.66 * 2.73 *** 3.74 *** 2.91 *** 3.16 ***
14 0.87 % 1.14% 2.62 % 0.62 % 1.09 %
6.53 *** 4.10 *** 4.41 *** 1.54 4.75 ***
15 1.23% 1.51 % 2.82 % 0.84 % 1.42 %
1.70 * 4.70 *** 4.40 *** 2.07 ** 3.85 ***
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Table 12: Daily Abnormal Transaction Volume of Shares Within -5 and +15 Days of 
______________________________Insider Purchases______________________________
This table lists the daily abnormal transaction volume of shares for insider purchases occurring up to and 
including the date measured for each category of insider and for the weighted average. These measurements 
have been taken at each day from 5 days prior to the transaction through 15 days subsequent to the transaction. 
Underneath each date is the associated T-statistic, and its corresponding significance as noted by stars. 
Significance is noted as: 90% *, 95% **, 99% ***. The Т-Statistic for the average is calculated based on the 
standard error for the distribution of all transactions occurring on that day.
Day Senior Officer Director of Issuer Large Shareholder Other insider(s) Average
-5 -0.08 % -0.11 % -0.07 % -0.11 % -0.08 %
-0.65 -1.53 -0.70 -1.59 -1.14
-4 -0.11 % 0.35 % -0.13% 0.16% -0.06 %
-0.84 3.05 *** -1.02 0.60 -0.95
-3 0.48 % -0.37 % -0.9 % -0.05 % 0.28 %
1.86 * -2.76 *** -3.06 *** -1.07 2.21 **
-2 -0.23 % 0.20 % 0.22 % -0.16% -0.10 %
-1.10 2.21 ** 1.53 -2.59 *** -2.31 **
-1 0.22 % 0.38 % 0.01 % 0.44 % 0.20 %
0.81 1.64 0.05 1.81 * 2.67 ***
0 0.40 % 0.08 % 0.46 % 0.13 % 0.37 %
1.75 * 1.25 2.89 *** 1.70 * 2.16 **
1 -0.87 % 0.03 % 0.46 % 0.57 % -0.48 %
-3.11 *** 1.56 2.55 ** 2.05 ** -3.04 ***
2 0.45 % 0.33 % -0.59 % 0.05 % 0.23 %
1.94 * 2.63 *** -3.41 *** 0.61 2.36 **
3 0.25 % 0.29 % 0.38 % 0.13 % 0.28 %
3.41 *** 1.79 * 2.71 *** 1.30 2.85 **♦
4 -0.33 % -0.74 % 0.39 % -0.77 % -0.25 %
-1.54 -1.73 * 2.71 *** -2.49 ** -1.79 *
5 0.01 % 0.32 % 0.33 % 0.01 % 0.09 %
0.11 3.53 *** 4.06 *** 0.03 0.85
6 0.17% 0.37 % -0.44 % 0.17% 0.07 %
1.88 * 3.24 *** -1.94 * 1.41 2.39 **
7 0.67 % -0.71 % 0.47 % 0.11 % 0.50 %
2.35 ** -4.07 *** 2.29 ** 0.98 3.21 ***
8 -0.33 % 0.43 % -0.52 % 0.19% -0.28 %
-1.14 1.60 -2.01 ** 1.57 -1.96 **
9 -0.09 % -0.01 % -0.17% -0.23 % -0.11 %
-0.94 -0.40 -1.82 * -1.88 * -1.25
10 -0.08 % -0.13 % 0.63 % 0.67 % 0.07 %
-0.79 -2.03 2.46 ** 1.72 * 2.13 **
11 0.03 % 0.44 % 0.31 % -0.52 % 0.09 %
0.36 4.62 *** 2.83 *** -3.62 *** 2.52 **
12 0.29 % -0.53 % 0.66 % 0.29 % 0.29 %
2.47 ** -4.55 *** 3.00 *** 2.04 ** 2.48 **
13 0.31 % 0.37 % -0.32 % 0.28 % 0.19 %
2.57 ** 4.92 *** -2.40 ** 1.89 * 4.45 ***
14 0.22 % 0.38 % 0.75 % -0.79 % 0.29 %
1.76 * 4.11 *** 5.09 *** -5.07 *** 6.20 ***
15 0.19% 0.28 % 0.32 % 0.16% 0.22 %
1.51 3.09 *** 2.07 ** 1.08 4.58 ***
41
Table 13: Daily Abnormal Transaction Volume of Shares Within -5 and +15 Days of 
________________________________Insider Sales________________________________
This table lists the daily abnormal transaction volume of shares for insider sales occurring up to and including 
the date measured for each category of insider and for the weighted average. These measurements have been 
taken at each day from 5 days prior to the transaction through 15 days subsequent to the transaction. 
Underneath each date is the associated T-statistic, and its corresponding significance as noted by stars. 
Significance is noted as: 90% *, 95% **, 99% ***. The Т-Statistic for the average is calculated based on the 
standard error for the distribution of all transactions occurring on that day.
Day Senior Officer Director of Issuer Large Shareholder Other insider(s) Average
-5 -0.13% -0.05 % -0.05 % 0.04 % -0.10 %
-2.12 ** -2.16 ** -2.29 ** 0.99 -1.73 *
-4 0.37 % -0.02 % -0.11 % -0.08 % 0.26 %
1.46 -2.19 ** -0.52 -1.76 * 1.93 *
-3 -0.00 % 0.55 % -0.11 % 0.20 % 0.04 %
-0.08 2.71 *** -0.49 0.67 0.59
-2 -0.14% -0.42 % 0.71 % -0.57 % -0.09 %
-2.90 *** -1.74 * 3.31 **♦ -1.67 -1.19
-1 0.27 % 0.16% 0.10% 1.15% 0.28 %
5.31 *** 1.88 * 2.58 *** 3.15 *** 3.65 ***
0 0.05 % 0.12% -0.04 % -0.01 % 0.04 %
1.04 1.86 * -1.30 -0.31 3.34 ***
1 -0.05 % 0.30 % -0.09 % 0.42 % -0.00 %
-0.98 3.41 *** -2.63 ** 5.26 *** -2.19 **
2 0.12% 0.36 % -0.19% 0.32 % 0.11 %
1.63 4.01 *** -4.79 *** 3.42 *** 2.09 **
3 -0.03 % 0.22 % 0.24 % -0.73 % -0.01 %
-0.48 2.48 ** 1.29 -1.96 * -0.52
4 -0.30 % -0.68 % 1.21 % -0.09 % -0.15 %
-3.94 *** -4.28 *** 5.34 *** -1.23 -2.82 ***
5 0.20 % 0.18% 0.18% -0.32 % 0.17 %
2.96 *♦* 2.44 ** 2.99 *** -4.08 *** 3.18 ***
6 0.24 % 0.30 % -0.69 % 0.17% 0.13 %
4.18 *** 2.95 *** -3.67 *** 2.05 ** 3.38 ***
7 0.31 % 0.33 % 0.27 % 0.38 % 0.31 %
5.56 *** 3.75 *** 2.29 ** 4.89 *** 4.89 ***
8 -0.07 % -0.54 % 0.28 % 0.09 % -0.06 %
-0.94 -4.20 *** 1.88 * 1.03 -2.83 **
9 -0.12% 0.00 % -0.62 % -0.62 % -0.19 %
-1.71 * 0.01 -3.96 *** -5.25 *** -3.41 ***
10 -0.07 % -0.27 % 0.25 % 0.22 % -0.04 %
-1.03 -2.98 *** 1.65 2.56 *** -2.07 ♦ *
11 -0.07 % 0.35 % 0.40 % 0.23 % 0.03 %
-1.12 3.87 *** 2.59 *** 1.95 * 1.35
12 0.40 % 0.38 % 0.38 % 0.13 % 0.38 %
1.80 * 4.18 *** 2.43 *** 1.04 4.88 ***
13 0.40 % -0.54 % 0.26 % 0.22 % 0.29 %
1.52 -4.17 *** 1.52 2.57 *** 3.95 ***
14 -0.47 % 0.38 % 0.23 % -0.53 % -0.32 %
-2.54 ** 4.46 *** 1.13 -1.52 -4.31 ***
15 0.35 % 0.36 % 0.19% 0.21 % 0.33 %
2.58 ** 4.07 *** 1.66 2.09 ** 2.97 ***
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The results of this study strongly support the evidence found in older insider trading papers 
Rogoff (1964), Glass (1966), Lorie & Neiderhoffer (1968), Scholes (1972) Jaffe (1974), that 
in companies for which information is relatively poorly available, or then difficult to acquire, 
the trades completed by insiders are interpreted by the market as signals of future potential 
performance.
Furthermore, from Tables 10 and 11 we can also see that the trades by large shareholders 
caused the largest volume of shares to be traded during the period 0 to +10, while at the same 
time trading approximately 0.45% and 0.30% of their company’s shares for the buys and sells 
respectively in Table 5. In all categories of insiders, we can see that they are on average net 
buyers of shares, and the largest accumulators of shares.
Because of the apparent attribution of future price prediction caused by insider trading, Lorie 
& Neiderhoffer’s (1968) statement that “proper and prompt analysis of data on insider trading 
can be profitable” holds true for these companies. It also gives strong credence in most of the 
insider categories to their view that by the time the insider trade information was publicly 
available, very little further profits are to be made from acting on the published data, as 
68.92% of the CAR had accumulated by day +10 for insider buys, and 90.77%22 for sales by 
insiders.
The difference in the levels CAR from table attributed to each category of insider also concurs 
with the conclusions of Seyhun (1985) that higher level insiders trade on more valuable 
information and cause greater levels of CAR. Though, the value assigned to different types of 
information is different for each type of major market participant. The typical interpretation 
of Seyhun’s (1985) conclusions is true mainly for average investors who attribute value to 
corporate decision makers, as senior officers and directors receive their largest changes in 
CAR and CAV after the public disclosure of the trade information. The street gossip 
participants on the other hand, appear to attribute more importance to insiders that possess a 
greater financial stake in the company, as the CAR and CAV occurring between 0 and +10 is 
greatest for large shareholders and other insiders.
22 Calculated as weighted averages of CAR on day 15 vs. day 10 for purchases and sales separately. See tables 7 
and 8.
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This could be either because the professional investors that comprise the “street gossip” 
participants consider financial influence as more high level information than average 
investors who perceive intimate knowledge of the daily corporate activities as more important 
information. These points will be discussed further in later subsections of the discussion 
section.
This also agrees with the findings of Basel & Stein (1979) who found that financial backers of 
the firms (i.e. bankers, which approximate the large shareholder category in the context of this 
study) received the highest cumulative abnormal returns. In fact, the ratio between the 
amount of CAR earned by their study and this paper’s results are a close match. Basel & 
Stein found that the ratio of CAR for bankers to ordinary insiders (i.e. officers and directors of 
the firms) for insider purchases was 2.0523 while for sales their results indicated a ratio of 
1.524. My results indicate a ratio for insider purchases of 2.32, and for insider sales 1.9825 
showing that the market appears to attribute a similar amount of additional value to large 
financial shareholders in the Canadian market in both cases.
In agreement with the findings of Jaffe (1974) the results show that insiders were equally as 
likely to sell shares as they are to purchase them with total buy and sell levels differing by 
only 1.9%. As insiders are often compensated using shares, it seems reasonable that we 
observed a high degree of selling and of purchasing for employees of the firms, as most of 
these trades would have been the exercise of options counted as buys, and their disposal in the 
marketplace counted as sells. Though, in reality, we observed a net accumulation of shares26, 
which also concurs with Jaffe’s findings that insiders are on average net accumulators of 
shares in their companies. This implies that insiders are also purchasing more shares than 
they are selling and thereby must be using their personal wealth to invest further into the
23 7.8%/3.8% at the end of 12 months.
24 -6.3%/-4.3% at the end of 12 months.
25 These ratios were calculated based on using the final CAR values obtained on day+15. I use Large 
shareholders as the equivalent for their bankers category, and a weighted average value of senior officers and 
directors to represent the ordinary insider category. The results are based on the ratios for purchases of
3.15%/l .355% and -5.33%/-2.68% for sales.
26 Accumulation by insider category on average for the entire period studied:
Senior officer: 12.66%,




business. Hence, on average, insiders appear to show confidence in the ability of their firms 
to return a profit, and thence have a positive outlook on the future.
The even level of buying to selling (by number of transactions) may stem from the way in 
which transactions were classified in this study, and may in fact under estimate the amount of 
shares owned by insiders (those who are employees of the firm with particular emphasis on 
managers). Theoretically, if insiders are buying at a rate only slightly higher than they are 
selling, then their expected holdings at any given time should be equal to the difference 
between their average purchasing and selling amounts. However, since I did not include the 
outright grant of shares of as a transaction to be measured, the real net ownership and 
accumulation ratios may not be accurately reflected by this study’s results. As the insider 
initiated buy/sell ratio is already positive, by adding to that sum the shares that are granted 
without charge to insiders as compensation we can see that these insiders are in fact, 
potentially accumulating many more shares than measured. This effect would be most 
notable for senior officers and directors whom already have accumulation percentages of 
12.7% and 0.65% meaning that senior officers indeed accumulate shares to a very high 
degree.
5.1 Low Share Price and Liquidity Effect
From Figures 6 and 7 we can see that the slopes of the CAR curves are volatile, though 
relatively consistently increasing during the time before public release. This could be due to 
the trickle effect, as the more people that know about the information; the more it spreads into 
the market and causes a gradual rise in activity. Alternatively (or concurrently) it could also 
be a result of knowledgeable market players attempting to cause only gradual changes in the 
market to avoid raising suspicions, or setting off any alarms (in particular those set by market 
observers at the OSA). However, it is important to note that the average trend shown here 
does not reflect the fact that for most firms the curves are not quite so smooth. In most cases 
(particularly those where the company’s shares are worth less than 50 cents each) the curve is 
much more volatile with spikes up and down, though still maintaining a trend 
upwards/downwards in a buy/sell situation as seen in Figures 6 and 7. Hence, observation of 
any individual transaction does not give an accurate reflection of the aggregate curves and 
changes. Unfortunately this is also a factor when comparing these results to those of previous 
studies, as the prior literature does not contain a graphical representation of the development
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of their abnormal returns, nor do they present them in sufficiently frequent intervals to be able 
to make any meaningful comparisons. They only present final results, or at best, such as in 
the case of Jaffe (1974) they present the information from three intervals within the study.
An unavoidable inherent weakness of this study stems from the nature of the shares 
examined. Since JNRs are generally worth very little for the majority of their existence, they 
also have share prices that normally range between 10 to 50 cents. The problem with this is 
that any change in share prices that may occur through trading of the security (be it to adjust 
for an insider’s signal effect or for any other reason) will cause a significant change in 
percentage tenns in the price of the security. Unfortunately, this change may not accurately 
reflect the intended percentage change desired by the market, but due to the indivisibility of 
the smallest unit of change available27, it is the minimum by which the price can change. This 
phenomenon was observed in many of the low share price companies, in the form of 
extremely volatile results. The day to day change in CAR for some of these firms was noted 
to have been in excess of 20% and even 30% in some cases. This was seen in some 
transactions as fluctuations between negative and positive CAR results, or sudden spikes 
along a trend either increasing or decreasing depending on the transaction type (either buy or 
sell respectively). Compounding this problem is that the majority of JNR firms in general are 
priced at these low levels. However, in the other firms that were priced above that level, 
much less anomalous CAR volatility was noted, and the shape of their respective curves 
approached the appearance of the average curves for each category of insider as presented in 
the results section.
It is due to these low prices that an average investor would be hard pressed to observe an 
insider’s trade between days 0 and 10 in low priced stocks since the stock’s day to day 
volatility may serve to cloak the trade without a clear trend until several days past the 
transaction date.
Taking the above into account, although this may seem like an extremely profitable idea to 
mimic the trades of insiders by observing the trend and trading the stock soon between 0 and 
10, it is probably not feasible for the average investor to do, unless they have access to some 
level of confirmation of the existence of insider trading, or of the root cause of the trade from
46
a reliable source. For the average investor, obtaining access to such information is extremely 
difficult at best. Although modem technologies such as the internet have created discussion 
forums for investors to exchange views on particular stocks, and potentially ease (and 
accelerate) the spread of such information, the reality of the situation is that these fomms 
contain typically little more than amateurish speculation and a minimum of useful 
information. They are not a place in which members of the “street gossip’' participants would 
go to spread their information.
Amplifying the low share price effect on CAR is another important factor in CAR 
calculations that is a typical characteristic in JNRs. That is, a low level of liquidity. Since 
these companies are often anywhere from micro cap in size (less than 10 million dollars 
quoted value) to small cap (100 million dollars quoted value), the investor base (by number of 
active traders) for any one company is bound to be small. Confirming that theory, many of 
these companies were also seen to have multiple consecutive days without any transactions, 
though this is not visible in the abnonnal volume tables which only gives averages of the 
categories.
This can also affect the CAR results, as when days may go by without any volume, no 
changes in the price of the share to reflect changing views of the market. Oftentimes this can 
be due to as simple a fact as either a bid-ask spread that is too far apart to result in 
transactions, or then a lack of market participants willing to trade the security at all to be able 
to shift the pre-insider trade price towards its correct insider trade information incorporated 
price level, which would also logically agree with the concept presented by Glosten & 
Milgrom (1985) that the markets may be maintaining a larger bid-ask spread to counteract the 
effects of insiders trading in these firms in an attempt to prevent the insiders from being able 
to transact and earn significant abnormal profits.
7 On the TSX Venture Exchange the smallest unit is 0.5 cents, though after a stock’s price is over 25 cents the 
most popular unit becomes 1 cent even though the 0.5 cent unit is still available.
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5.2 Market Expectations
What is interesting to note is that on average, the CAR is experiencing greater losses for sells 
than gains for buys. This agrees with the findings of Basel & Stein (1979), and Jabbour & 
Jalivand (2000), and is occurring in very similar ratios to those studies as well, as shown in 
Table 14 below. It appears that investors are more severely reacting to bad news implied by 
trades than to good news.
Table 14: Buy to Sell ratio of CAR for Comparable Studies
When comparing the size of CAR caused by buys 
resemble those of other similar studies.
versus sells, the ratios obtained by this study clearly
Study Buy to Sell ratio of CAR
Jabbour & Jalivand -0.67
Basel & Stein -0.60
This study -0.52
In the context of this study, it seems to suggest that investors fear loosing their invested 
capital more than they wish to react to a potential “bonanza” or “lottery ticket” company. 
This could be seen as showing some conservatism in investors who wish to follow a more 
cautious wait and see style of investing and may wait for a couple more positive press releases 
to confirm that the company is a worthy investment target. On the other hand, when they see 
bad news they are more willing to believe it and push the price of a company down to ensure 
their capital is not lost. In short, it is easier to understand the implications of negative news 
than it is to overcome the wall of worry as to whether the discovery is economic or not.
This most likely stems from scepticism in the industry and investor base, as it is much more 
probable that a company rumoured to be doing poorly is actually doing poorly than a 
company rumoured to have found a large deposit of mineralization to be true28. Since 
historically, it has been the case that the majority of these companies have been unsuccessful, 
while the major finds have been rare. The market expects that the company’s probability of 
success will follow the average probability of the market, and thence, they react in the 
changes to the share’s prices based on those expectations.
28 Some of this scepticism is a remnant of the Bre-X Minerals Ltd. scandal that shook the marketplace in the mid 
1990’s and resulted in what was believed to be the world’s largest gold deposit that was revealed to have been 
created using fraudulent drill results. It resulted in a major revision of the reporting standards used, and the 
creation of National Instrument 43-101 which aims to ensure that drill results are reported accurately. See 
Fortune Magazine article.
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Some of the categories of insiders for which this study has tested have shown CAR results 
that were not in line with the expectations of the thesis. However, they may be in line with 
the market’s expectations. The market may expect that insiders are net buyers, and thus react 
less severely to insider purchases, as was seen in the fact that the absolute abnormal returns 
were much higher for sales than purchases. Those who are tied most closely to the company 
appear to be expected to believe in the company the most, and to have the highest 
accumulation ratios. Market expectations were proven in practice with one company, when in 
December of 2003 Goldcorp Inc. whose CEO sold over half of his holdings of his company’s 
shares29. This created shock in the market, and a dip in the company’s share price, as nobody 
had expected him to sell, particularly such a large amount30. This would also help to explain 
the relatively low senior officer CAR results, as it could be that the market expects that senior 
officers buy shares in the company, and that they “believe in it” regardless of the actual status 
of the company’s future prospects.
This is true for directors as well, but to a lesser degree, as they are somewhat distanced from 
the company, and as such, may not be as highly expected to continue to hold or accumulate 
shares in their finn.
Outside investors (i.e. large shareholders) on the other hand, most likely do not have any 
particular market expectations attached to them, which would imply that their CAR reactions 
could be said to be the least biased of all, as they are reflective of the opinions of market 
professionals that have carefully completed due diligence, and are most likely to follow a 
company with good growth potential, rather than focus on any one company due to other 
obligations or attachments.
10
See Forbes article, and SEDI.




A major reason that correlation is low and CAR is large is that from looking at the data, it 
would appear that insiders transact in clusters. This is true across multiple categories (i.e. 
large shareholders and senior officers both trade on the same day) closely spaced, either on 
the same day, or on consecutive days or then separated by just a few days.
Table 15 : Number of Simultaneous Transactions per Day Within a Single Firm
This table contains the count of the number of simultaneous transactions occurring within a given firm on a 
single trading day. The high level of simultaneous trade days (particularly the large cluster of up to 5 trades 
within a company per day may indicate that there is most likely some degree of insiders who are trading based 
on the same information. Alternatively, it may also simply be a reflection of the need to break down larger 
trades by insiders into portions that can be better absorbed or fulfilled by a relatively thin market. Though the 
precise source of this simultaneity is debatable; this degree of concurrence is very highly unlikely to be 
completely due to random coincidence.
1 2 3 456789 10
Purchases 4445 4872 2571 1342 1055 496 146 299 22 16
Sales 7478 4079 1715 1102 472 490 182 47 1 0
Therefore, it is likely that the CAR and CAV values for each of those transactions are 
amplified because of their concurrence, and as such don’t necessarily reflect the amount of 
shares traded in one particular trade, since the CAR is representative of all the trades 
combined over the period tested. This is also supported by the insignificance of these 
statistics (which were confident at only 54% and 73%). The theory behind this point is 
illustrated in Figure 8, where the compounding effect of insider trades and their associated 
calculations may cause the correlation coefficient to be erroneous.
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___________________Figure 8: Event Window Overlap Problem___________________
As an illustration of the issue faced with regards to insider trade clustering, we can see exactly why it can be 
so difficult to attribute any particular share price movements to one trade in particular. Here we can see that 
when trade 2 occurs and triggers the measurement of the abnormal returns it can be measuring price changes 
which are not purely related to it. This can cause particular difficulty in CAR and CAV attribution if the 
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This was observed more frequently in purchases in companies that were successful in the 
period following the transaction cluster. The fact that clustering occurs more with buys than 
sells appears to indicate that it is management acting on similar information at the same time 
(i.e. prior knowledge of upcoming good news) versus sales which may be more often 
motivated by personal reasons. Indeed, this strongly reinforces the idea that management is 
withholding information in accordance with the findings of Trueman (1983) in order to 
personally benefit from it financially before its public disclosure.
Alternatively, the correlation coefficient could be low because of insiders trading multiple 
small lots rather than one large one. Though the complex algorithms may not be used as was 
described in the literature review chapter, it is still possible that insiders have split their trade 
lots into smaller fractions in an effort to compensate for the firm's smaller liquidity or thinner 
market depth. This would also account for the large simultaneity of trades noted in Table 15.
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Another part of the reason that the correlation coefficient is insignificant for at least certain 
cases could be explained by the ownership structure behind the company. When there are 
relatively few owners (i.e. a high proportion of insider ownership) then the CAR and CAV 
reactions in these stocks should be less than in the more widely held securities. This is 
because the large owners (as insiders) would already be aware of the information on which 
one of the other insiders is trading, and the price should have already incorporated it.
5.4 Average Investor Last to Know
The most interesting result of the CAR and CAV calculations is that in every category of 
insider, there are definite and statistically significant CAR and CAV results increasing 
relatively consistently up to the date of the release of the information on SEDI 10 days later. 
After those 10 days, we can see another slight change in CAR and CAV. Clearly, this 
presents strong evidence for the theory that “street gossip” does occur, and that the 
information of an insider’s trade spreads quickly to other market players. However, the 
recipients of this infonnation appear not to be the average outside retail investor, as there is 
the small spike in CAR occurring after the public disclosure of the trade information on SEDI. 
The size of this spike is partly due to the fact that retail investors tend to hold very small 
fractions of the company’s total outstanding shares, and do not have the same degree of price 
influence as larger share block holders. The recipients of “street gossip” are most likely large 
holders of company stock who can act as market makers or manipulators. The other reason 
that the increase in CAR after publication is small is that by that time most, if not all of the 
information conveyed by the trade is incorporated into the stock price, and there is little 
adjustment room left for the average investor to make.
These “street gossip” participants must be professional investors who are either tied to the 
company through personal relationships (i.e. family members of insiders), large shareholders 
below the reporting limit (i.e. investors with significant ownership, though still less than 10%) 
or investment houses. Unfortunately for the average retail investor, this means that they are 
typically the last to know about changes in the company’s outlook, and therefore the ones 
from who more informed professionals tend to profit. Sadly this seems to indicate that at 
least for the JNR industry, from the perspective of insider trading’s effects, they are a
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category of stocks that are most profitable for well connected large market participants at the 
expense of average investors.
The existence of CAR and CAV prior to day +10 presents strong evidence that Meulbroek’s 
(1992) findings that the market detects insider trading and incorporates it into the stock price. 
However, Meulbroek does not specify how this detection and integration occur, and I suggest 
that at least in the case of JNRs the only way would be for market participants to hear 
rumours (street gossip) through which they would be able to look for anomalous or unusual 
activity in the day’s trades. One possible reason for the better informed nature of larger 
shareholders is their ability and willingness to devote more of their time to due diligence, and 
more frequent reviewing of the company’s status. Their investors pay them as managers to do 
just to enable acceptable rates of return. Average retail investors on the other hand, may not 
be able to devote as much time to such matters, and often buy shares based on the information 
contained only in press releases which they may or may not fully appreciate. They on 
average don’t attend company conferences or presentations where they would meet the major 
market participants and be able to potentially join the group of traders involved in “street 
gossip’’.
5.5 Other Insider
The highest values of CAR were noted in sales to have occurred in the category “Other 
Insiders”. Selling in this category caused particularly large CAR and CAV, which initially 
seems unexpected, considering that these insiders traded the fewest times and with the least 
amount of shares, but can be explained.
This insider group contains individuals and organizations that are at the core of the company, 
including a category for the company itself. Investors have assigned this category a 
particularly high signal value in negative cases due to the fact that category contains the issuer 
itself, and its subsidiaries. In the other categories of insiders who are employees, the insiders 
are all individuals, who could be seen to have different personal priorities for their funds (i.e. 
better growth opportunities elsewhere) or then interpret the information they receive 
differently than other insiders. These “human discrepancies” seem to have been taken into 
account in the CAR being lower for sales for those categories. In the case of the issuer itself, 
any moves made are as a result of a unanimous consensus amongst the leaders of the
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company, and their movements are therefore much more significant. In other words, if the 
company itself sells its own shares, people see that as an extremely serious indication of poor 
future prospects. Hence, if they are not interested in investing in themselves, then investors 
interpret that as there being a great likelihood that this stock would not be an appropriate 
investment for other outside investors either. This view must be particularly strong, as these 
sale transactions are for only 0.10 % of the company, which is the smallest figure of all of the 
insider categories.
This agrees with Scholes (1972) who concluded that the sales by the corporation and 
corporate officers (his equivalent category to my “other insiders”) contain information of 
significant value. They sell when the security is considered to be overvalued in the market, 
and see an opportunity to take profits. Though this could logically imply that highly positive 
CAR should occur for the other insider category as a show of solidarity by the company in 
purchasing its own shares. It should indicate a high degree of confidence in its future. From 
the results, we can see that this is the case, though absolute values of CAR for other insider 
purchases are not as high as the absolute CAR caused by sales. Clearly investors regard these 
purchases as important due to their reflection of a consensus of management and the board of 
directors as to the company’s future.
Another factor likely to be augmenting the CAR levels observed in this insider category is the 
timing of these trades. They are usually completed in times when the company is in its 
relative infancy or when the company is in a dormant stage, and its share price and transaction 
volume is the lowest, which is confirmed by this category receiving the lowest CAV of all 
categories for both buys and sells31. Any changes in the share price or spikes in trade volume 
in these periods raise the attention levels of the other market participants and causes an 
increase in activity, and a fluctuation in the share price. This is precisely why the other 
insider CAR curves are notably more volatile than other categories, as the share prices are 
low, and its changes cause a relatively large percentage change vs. the market index.
Meulbroek’s (1992) conclusion regarding the detectability of insider trading by the market is 
also most applicable in this case as an explanation of CAR results occurring immediately after 
day 0. As the company trades in its own shares, its trading house would be known to the
31 See tables 11 and 12
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market (unless the anonymous trading name is used), and large block trades in the company’s 
stock by that trading house would be inferred to be highly likely initiated by “other insider” 
traders. It could be argued that market detectability is difficult due to the availability of the 
Anonymous trade name, but since the true identities are released at the end of the day, market 
participants could still react to the information beginning on day +1.
5.6 Large Shareholder
Large shareholders are defined as individuals who own in excess of 10% of a company’s 
outstanding shares, but are not involved in its management. Most often these are banks, 
investment houses, and even wealthy private individuals that act as financiers that provide 
capital for the JNRs in order to continue to drill and explore their properties. In this study 
they received the most variable results, which some might interpret as odd, given that they are 
usually amongst the largest single holders of a stock. Again, this might be better understood 
when considering the unique aspects of JNRs. In many cases, (particularly those in which a 
company runs through cycles of unsuccessful properties) financiers continue to finance and 
refinance the company over several years. (This is reflected in this category having the 
highest average purchase amount).
The CAR of the observations was highly variable from company to company for large 
shareholders; with CAR for certain companies averaging close to zero, while in others it 
followed an extremely steep trend line. Upon further investigation, it appears that investors in 
different firms attribute different levels of information to trades by large shareholders based 
on the financing and trading strategy used to fund the company’s exploration endeavours.
For those companies in which a single large financier was used repetitively, the CAR was 
closest to zero. It appears that oftentimes these large shareholders have different investment 
priorities and criteria of a successful investment according to which they invest. They tend to 
prefer to invest purely for small but short term returns which may partly stem from flow­
through share investors. This results often in sales by a large shareholder even though they 
may have only gained a small fraction in their prices (about 10-15% returns). This is done 
because the investor is either impatient, reformulating their portfolio, or is performing what is 
known as a “pump and dump” strategy of financing. A pump and dump arises when an 
investment is made into the company by a large shareholder at a low point in the price cycle
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of the shares. They then begin to promote the company by completing road shows, or 
advertising to other investors at industry conventions32, etc. The influx of cash is usually 
enough to support continued drilling of the property, and on the excitement of new investors, 
they begin to exit. In these companies this can be relatively easy to do, as the large 
shareholder becomes a market maker by providing significant liquidity at a price of its choice. 
When a share price is only at 20 cents, a rise of 2-3 cents creates the 10-15% return desired by 
the financier. This practice is technically illegal, but its legality in practice can be blurred by 
positive reaction investors have to the news of an influx of cash. This is especially true (and 
particularly grey waters legally speaking) in companies that are relatively unsuccessful in 
their attempts to discover a deposit, or have just come out of a period of dormancy.
Figure 9: Cypress Resources Inc and the “Pump and Dump” Financing Strategy
One company that has been accused of using the pump and dump strategy of some JNRs, is Cypress Resources 
Inc. (CYP). Over the course of its recent past, it has had several financings, though its drill results had failed 
to reveal any meaningful mineralization on its properties. The peaks in the share prices perfectly coincide with 
each of these financings, raising accusation and suspicions among investors. At each of these times the 
company increased its promotion campaign and advertised the successes of its neighbouring JNR ventures’ 





32 The largest such convention is the PDAC (Prospector’s and Developer’s Association of Canada) conference 
held in Toronto each March. Major and minor industry players gather in an effort to spread knowledge of their 
findings, and to raise awareness of their company.
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The other main type of large shareholder is when they purchase mainly through private 
placements and trade less frequently, holding for longer intervals. These investors appear to 
be much more actively interested in their investment’s longer term prospects and accept 
greater risk for larger returns. These private placements, and indeed, many other large 
shareholder purchases occur after the large shareholder has visited the actual mineral 
property. It is common practice for JNRs to invite these investors to send an analyst 
representative to the actual site33 so that they can evaluate for themselves the potential of the 
property and aid them in making a decision to invest in the company34. Often these trips can 
include not only visual inspection of the land, but also a viewing of drill core, of which a 
portion may not yet have been analyzed and their results released publicly. Trading on this 
information is not technically illegal, as it is difficult to assign any quantitative value to 
unprocessed core, but visible mineralization in these samples is occasionally present, and does 
represent strong evidence of potentially positive drill results to come.
The investors of these companies appear to be aware of this, and it is reflected in not only the 
days preceding public dissemination, but also in the days following it. Both “street gossip’’ 
participants and average investors attribute significance to these transactions. The CAR and 
CAV from 0 to +10 can also be attributed to the large shareholders that own less than 10% 
(the reporting threshold) and trading in the stock, as they are also frequently participants in 
the site trips. The large shareholder trading news appears to be particularly well received by 
average investors, as seen by the increase in CAR after day +10. Though this could also be 
amplified by the fact that the average investors are more likely to read a press release35 by the 
company announcing a private placement and outlining its terms than they are to be vigilantly 
following the insider trading developments on SEDI and hence more aware of a large 
shareholder’s trade activity.
It could be argued, that since trades often occur within a short timeframe of a press release, 
that the information on which the market is reacting is not in fact based on the trade of the
33 Typically tins is done in large groups with multiple investors (or their representatives) to try and create 
competition for financing offers.
34 I myself have been lucky enough to have participated in such a trip, and was able to view unanalyzed and 
unpublished drill cores which contained large amounts of visible gold. The share price of that company rose 
significantly in the days immediately following that trip on abnormally high volume, indicating that it was 
highly likely trading was occurring based on the interpretations of what was seen in the cores that were 
presented.
35 Again, this could be compounded by the fact that the press release announcing the private placement normally 
appears at the same time as the SEDI release of large investor’s trade.
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insider, but rather that it is an interpretation of “street gossip” that relates to the information to 
be contained in the forthcoming press release.
5. 7 Senior Officer
Reactions to senior officers begin to occur immediately after the trade day, indicating that 
their trade information is released into the “street gossip” infonnation channels and that the 
“street gossip” participants view that information as significant and trade on it. In both 
purchases and sales of shares, senior officers have a slight run up in CAR demonstrating that 
they are purchasing (selling) shares at times at which they believe them to be undervalued 
(overvalued).
Senior officers are traditionally considered to have the greatest degree of information 
asymmetry compared to an average outside investor, and would then accordingly, be expected 
to cause the largest CAR, by introducing new information to the market.
From this study, we can determine that this is not true. Investors do not assign the highest 
absolute amount of CAR to these insiders, though the CAR that occurs for senior officers is 
statistically significant at a high level. Though, the sheer number of trades completed by 
senior officers could be diluting the information value that this test indicates investors to be 
assigning to a senior officer. Investors are more likely to be less concerned with each 
transaction individually, and more with the aggregate trend of a senior officer’s trades, as any 
single trade could be a simple realization of income, whereas a trend of sales or purchases 
could indicate asymmetrical knowledge with the market.
The average investor, on the other hand, assigns a very large information value to senior 
officers, as can be seen by the large upwards spike in CAR after a purchase, and an equally 
large descent after a sale occurring after the public disclosure of a sale.
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5.8 Directors
Based on the results of this study, directors are not seen as having particularly beneficial 
information by the “street gossip” portion of market participants. Alternatively, it could be 
argued that due to the relative distance and independence from the company that directors 
keep, they are not as integrated into the “street gossip” channels, and knowledge of their trade 
does not spread to market participants as broadly as for other insider categories.
However, the average investor does appear to attribute some informational value to their 
trades. Judging by the run up in CAR prior to a director’s trade, it would seem that they are 
merely selling at a time when the market value of the share has been high (or at least 
increasing) and they have simply seen an opportunity to realize gains on their holdings.
Here we can see that directors are observed to have nearly no CAR in sales, though some 
statistically significant CAR in purchases. This could be due to the fact that directors are 
generally expected to be at an arm’s length from the company, and not involved in its day to 
day activities, but rather just in making major decisions and acting as a supervisory group. 
Therefore, investors regard them as having less of an ability to forecast the value of the 
security. The declines caused by senior officers on the other hand, indicates that investors 
strongly believe this group of individuals to be the best informed of the reporting parties, and 
thence the ones to follow when regarding consideration of the company’s future.
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6 Conclusion
This thesis investigates the information relating to future performance potential conveyed by 
trades by insiders in junior natural resource companies, and the timing of the information’s 
integration into the security’s price. This is examined in two manners; the daily and 
cumulative abnormal price returns caused by insider trades; and the daily and cumulative 
abnormal volumes caused by insider trades. In order to perform this study I construct a 
dataset of 313 firms traded on the Venture Exchange of the Toronto Stock Exchange in which 
31,047 transactions are made between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2006.
In accordance with historic literature (Rogoff 1964, Glass 1966, Lorie & Niederhoffer 1968, 
Scholes 1972, and Jaffe 1974) as well as the more recent (Smith & McNally 2003, Basel & 
Stein 1979, Lee & Bishra 1990, and Jabbour, Jalivand & Switzer 2000), trades by insiders are 
interpreted by the market to hold information with regard to future performance potential. 
My study indicates that this holds true for junior natural resource companies. Different 
insiders are motivated to trade based on different information, and their trades cause different 
reactions in the market as demonstrated in their cumulative abnormal return curves. 
However, the size of the trade made cannot be definitively said to hold any effect on the 
magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns caused.
Due to the nature of this industry, insider trade information appears to be available to the 
market ahead of its official disclosure date. There are as a result, market participants who are 
able to profit from this information which is at the expense of the uninformed investor.
The problem with this, and indeed all previous similar studies, as Meulbroek (1992) correctly 
points out, is that they are based on reported insider transactions, which for all legal intents 
and purposes should not be based on non-public information. In order to truly judge the 
effects of an insider’s trade it should include all violative transactions that would not be 
reported to SEDI. Only then, could the true effect of an insider’s knowledge and the market’s 
interpretation of those trades as a signal be measured. Unfortunately, this also has the 
problem of being difficult to measure, as unreported transactions are not available in any
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database. Although, even from casual review of recent headlines, it is easy to see that this is 
not an unknown occurrence36.
Though even the validity of this point could be argued, as although according to Canadian 
law, an insider is barred from trading when they are in possession of material information that 
is price sensitive and as of yet undisclosed to the market, the law does not adequately define 
what this constitutes. These laws are relatively vague in creating a picture of when trading 
would be illegal or legal, and some companies are finding it difficult to keep insiders from 
trading on that information due to the relatively low threat of prosecution. This would be for 
example, in the case of a JNR, when the results of a drill program that would be known for up 
to one week before their dissemination. Consequently, many companies in the Canadian 
market (not only JNRs) are instituting formal 48 hour blackout period policies during which 
insiders cannot trade before a press release or after a news release, to ensure that the market 
participants are not unduly taken advantage of by those most aware of the implications of the 
news release.
One could also argue that another potential flaw of this study is that it covers a period of only 
20 days, and does not determine the longer term effects of insider trading, such as if it were to 
decrease back to zero. I counter, that completing such a long time framed study might give 
inaccurate results, as by a later date a press release and other insider transactions may occur 
which could impact the results (and indeed may already be a factor in these results as was 
explained in Figure 8). These factors would be difficult to isolate and remove, and therefore 
cause an unavoidable bias risk.
With regards to which transactions to include, it could be debated that options should not be 
included because they don't necessarily represent information pertaining to future 
performance, but rather for tax and estate planning reasons such as shifting the accumulated 
value to other accounts in the form of shares (ex. Exercise of options and then transferring the 
resulting common shares to a registered retirement savings account or spouse).
36 A classic (and famous) example of illegal Canadian insider trading is Andrew Rankin, who worked in the 
Royal Bank of Canada’s Dominion Securities mergers & acquisition department and was exploited by a friend to 
find out what major deals were coming up, earning the pair millions in profits. Only a bungled securities trade 
executed in a panic out of a Luxembourg account exposed the leak (See CBC television broadcast )
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6.1 Areas for further research
Though this study sheds some light on the nature of a relatively untransparent market 
segment, it also leaves open some areas for further research. Unfortunately the following two 
topics could not be addressed in this study, as time constraints and information availability 
forced their exclusion. However, I believe that they would be important issues to investigate 
so that the full effect of insider trading could be analyzed within every affected dimension.
Primarily, I believe that it would be important to investigate the implications of Glosten & 
Milgrom’s (1985) bid-ask spread theory’s application here, given the potential for information 
asymmetry and low market depth. There may indeed be some significant changes in the bid- 
ask spread as information is released to the market, which would aid in determining the exact 
timing of the spread of “street gossip”, and the changes in market depth associated with 
insider trades.
Furthermore, determining the relationship between the ownership structure vs. the abnormal 
returns and volume could also shed some light on the price making power of the market 
participants for these firms. This could potentially better define which firm structures are 
susceptible to street gossip, and which firm structures best integrate all public and non-public 
information into the security’s price.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Appendix 1 : Definition of an Insider According to the Securities Act of Ontario
This is a collection of excerpts from: Section 1. Interpretation, other general matters Definitions of the 
Securities Act of Ontario which defines the legal meaning of the term “insider” and its subcategories and their 
definitions in accordance with the Act. For the sake of brevity, the French language equivalent terms and their 
definitions have been excluded from this material.
“insider” or “insider of a reporting issuer” means,
(a) every director or senior officer of a reporting issuer,
(b) every director or senior officer of a company that is itself an insider or subsidiary 
of a reporting issuer,
(c) any person or company who beneficially owns, directly or indirectly, voting 
securities of a reporting issuer or who exercises control or direction over voting securities of a 
reporting issuer or a combination of both carrying more than 10 per cent of the voting rights 
attached to all voting securities of the reporting issuer for the time being outstanding other 
than voting securities held by the person or company as underwriter in the course of a 
distribution, and
(d) a reporting issuer where it has purchased, redeemed or otherwise acquired any of 
its securities, for so long as it holds any of its securities,
“senior officer” means,
(a) the chair or a vice-chair of the board of directors, the president, a vice-president, 
the secretary, the treasurer or the general manager of a company or any other individual who 
performs functions for an issuer similar to those normally performed by an individual 
occupying any such office, and
(b) each of the five highest paid employees of an issuer, including any individual 
referred to in clause (a),
“director”, where used in relation to a person, includes a person acting in a capacity similar to 
that of a director of a company,
“reporting issuer” means an issuer,
(a) that has issued voting securities on or after the 1 st day of May, 1967 in respect of 
which a prospectus was filed and a receipt therefor obtained under a predecessor of this Act or 
in respect of which a securities exchange take-over bid circular was filed under a predecessor 
of this Act,
(b) that has filed a prospectus and has obtained a receipt for it under this Act,
(b.l) that has filed a securities exchange take-over bid circular under this Act before 
December 14, 1999,
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(c) any of whose securities have been at any time since the 15th day of September, 
1979 listed and posted for trading on any stock exchange in Ontario recognized by the 
Commission, regardless of when such listing and posting for trading commenced,
(d) to which the Business Corporations Act applies and which, for the purposes of that 
Act, is offering its securities to the public,
(e) that is the company whose existence continues following the exchange of securities 
of a company by or for the account of such company with another company or the holders of 
the securities of that other company in connection with,
(i) a statutory amalgamation or arrangement, or
(ii) a statutory procedure under which one company takes title to the assets of 
the other company that in turn loses its existence by operation of law, or under which the 
existing companies merge into a new company, or
(f) that the Commission has deemed to be a reporting issuer under section 83.1,
where one of the amalgamating or merged companies or the continuing company has been a 
reporting issuer for at least twelve months,
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